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<article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/" article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.2" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">RUDN Journal of Philosophy</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="en">RUDN Journal of Philosophy</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Cерия: Философия</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn publication-format="print">2313-2302</issn><issn publication-format="electronic">2408-8900</issn><publisher><publisher-name xml:lang="en">Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba (RUDN University)</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">46198</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22363/2313-2302-2025-29-3-775-794</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="edn">DFTUEH</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>PHILOSOPHY IN LATIN AMERICA</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИЛОСОФИЯ В ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКЕ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="article-type"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title xml:lang="en">Philosophy of Mind in Latin America</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Философия сознания в Латинской Америке</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4823-5883</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name xml:lang="en"><surname>Leclerc</surname><given-names>André</given-names></name><name xml:lang="ru"><surname>Леклерк</surname><given-names>Андре</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="en"><p>PhD, Full-Time Professor</p></bio><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>доктор философии, штатный профессор</p></bio><email>andre.leclerc55@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff1"><aff><institution xml:lang="en">University of Brasília</institution></aff><aff><institution xml:lang="ru">Университет Бразилии</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff2"><aff><institution xml:lang="en">National Scientific and Technical Research Council</institution></aff><aff><institution xml:lang="ru">Национальный совет по научно-техническим исследованиям</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2025-09-30" publication-format="electronic"><day>30</day><month>09</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>29</volume><issue>3</issue><issue-title xml:lang="en">PHILOSOPHY IN LATIN AMERICA</issue-title><issue-title xml:lang="ru">ФИЛОСОФИЯ В ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКЕ</issue-title><fpage>775</fpage><lpage>794</lpage><history><date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2025-09-30"><day>30</day><month>09</month><year>2025</year></date></history><permissions><copyright-statement xml:lang="en">Copyright ©; 2025, Leclerc A.</copyright-statement><copyright-statement xml:lang="ru">Copyright ©; 2025, Леклерк А.</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Leclerc A.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Леклерк А.</copyright-holder><ali:free_to_read xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/"/><license><ali:license_ref xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0</ali:license_ref></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://journals.rudn.ru/philosophy/article/view/46198">https://journals.rudn.ru/philosophy/article/view/46198</self-uri><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>In most countries of Latin America, there are philosophers working in the philosophy of mind. Interesting contributions has been made to all the important themes of recent Philosophy of mind in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Columbia. There are works on Externalism, Naturalism, Enactivism, Extended Mind, Physicalism, Mental Causation, Intentionality, Consciousness and the phenomenal mind, Action Theory, Philosophy of Information, Ecological Psychology, Philosophy of Perception, of Emotion, of Memory, etc. There are many organized research groups working on the theory of mind and cognitive sciences, and regular conferences on these subjects. It will be hard to consider all the contributions in a short paper. My aim is to highlight the main contributions and to emphasize the relevance of the current research in that domain as part of the analytic movement in Latin America.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="ru"><p>В большинстве стран Латинской Америки есть философы, работающие в области философии сознания. Интересный вклад был внесен во все важные темы современной философии сознания в Аргентине, Бразилии, Мексике, Чили и Колумбии. Существуют работы по экстернализму, натурализму, энактивизму, расширенному сознанию, физикализму, ментальной каузальности, интенциональности, сознанию и феноменальному сознанию, теории действия, философии информации, экологической психологии, философии восприятия, эмоций, памяти и т. д. Имеется множество организованных исследовательских групп, работающих над теорией сознания и когнитивными науками, и регулярно проводятся конференции по этим темам. В краткой статье будет сложно рассмотреть все материалы. Моя цель - выделить основные достижения и подчеркнуть актуальность современных исследований в этой области как части аналитического движения в Латинской Америке.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>analytic philosophy</kwd><kwd>intentionality</kwd><kwd>consciousness</kwd><kwd>perception</kwd><kwd>emotion</kwd><kwd>naturalism</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>аналитическая философия</kwd><kwd>интенциональность</kwd><kwd>сознание</kwd><kwd>восприятие</kwd><kwd>эмоции</kwd><kwd>натурализм</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group/></article-meta><fn-group/></front><body></body><back><ref-list><ref id="B1"><label>1.</label><mixed-citation>Hahn LE, editor. The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. The Library of Living Philosophers. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court; 1999.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="B2"><label>2.</label><mixed-citation>Simpson T. Formas lógicas, realidad y significado. 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