The latest progress of empirical studies of consciousness and spectacular advances in AI technologies kick philosophy out of the familiar comfort of uncontrolled proliferation of concepts and scholastic disputes. In the overview of the current state of empirical theories of consciousness, I reveal that those theories still find themselves at the pre-paradigmatic stage, therefore not yet comprising an immediate existential threat to philosophy of consciousness, though making it watch out. I make an attempt to deal with the familiar polysemy of the term 'consciousness' stripping its meaning from parts already susceptible to science and technology and from parts still highly unlikely to be explained away. Besides, I specify the relation between philosophy and science in general by analyzing them to their inner dynamics of theories and ontologies, showing that for science the distinction of the two is substantially more important than for philosophy. From this perspective, I argue that philosophical schemas of consciousness claiming to be ‘experiential’ must have met recently formulated criteria for empirical theories of consciousness, otherwise failing to explain anything in the domain. On the way, I touch on the issues of intentionality and representation. Finally, I add my own pragmatic criterion that addresses technological perspectives a theory provides. In the end of the day, a winning competitive theory will have to let us produce and control artificial conscious devices.