From 2003 to 2009, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States engaged in a series of multilateral negotiations to address North Korea’s nuclear program. On September 19, 2005, the six participants achieved a “gold standard” agreement on denuclearization. North Korea agreed to relinquish all nuclear weapons, abstain from deploying nuclear weapons, and rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as adhere to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The United States affirmed its lack of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and expressed no intention of attacking or invading the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with nuclear or conventional weapons. China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States concurred to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. Furthermore, the agreement established the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action,” which holds significance for the spirit of future engagement. The prevailing impasse in resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula prompts the inquiry of a possible negotiation model. This paper uses the Harvard negotiation method to examine a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) between China, North Korea, Russia, and the United States, which culminated in the September 19, 2005 Six Party Talks agreement addressing the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The first section of the article is devoted to scrutinizing the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), which facilitated the 2005 agreement. Based on the acquired insights, the second section assesses the prospects for implementing the 2005 Joint Statement in the current context. This section also concentrates on identifying a ZOPA under current conditions, taking into account past experiences and lessons learned from past negotiations.