
МИР И БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ

KYRGYZSTAN 2010—2011: FROM CONFLICT TO FRAGILE STABILITY

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Kyrgyzstan had to manage complex systemic changes when, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it embarked on a series of rapid social, economic and political transitions. This paper summarises the main factors that created a conflict-prone society, then analyses the evolution of the 2010 conflict; lastly, it considers the prospects for stability following the return to political processes. The author examines regional and international responses to the Kyrgyz crisis.

Key words: Kyrgyzstan, the 2010 Kyrgyz conflict, political development, state management, ethnic communities, parliamentary elections, presidential elections.

The conflict that engulfed Kyrgyzstan in 2010 was shocking because of its ferocity, but not because it was without precedent [1]. There had been numerous civil disturbances in previous years, including armed clashes in Uzgen in 1990, Batken in 1999—2000, Aksy in 2002 and Jalal-Abad in 2005. Yet in 2010 the violence reached a new level of intensity, culminating in an internecine struggle between ethnic communities that had previously co-existed in relative harmony. This sudden eruption of brutal anger towards neighbours and fellow citizens was hard to accept, hard to explain rationally. It was easier to shift the blame to others. Conspiracy theories multiplied, pinpointing assorted culprits. The favourite explanation was that a ‘third force’ was responsible, variously identified as the ousted Bakiev faction, Islamist groups, criminal gangs, foreign powers — Russia or the US — or some combination of these elements [16]. Possibly some of these allegations contained a degree of truth, but they were by no means the whole story. Rather, the events of 2010 must be seen in the context of two sets of issues: structural factors — the ‘givens’ of geography and history — and systemic factors relating to recent political development and state management.

The structural factors include a history scored by rupture and discontinuity, a fragmented physical and human geography, an extreme climate, a remote, landlocked location and a limited resource base. These features would, under any circumstances, have

made it difficult to create a cohesive, modern society. However, Kyrgyzstan also had to manage complex systemic changes when, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it embarked on a series of rapid social, economic and political transitions. The process was further complicated by uneasy relations with neighbouring states, as well as the competing regional interests of great powers (i.e. Russia, US and China). The combination of these factors deepened existing divisions and opened up new rifts, contributing to the further fragmentation of society. This paper begins by summarising the main ‘conflictogenic’ fault lines within the country — the factors that created a conflict-prone society — then analyses the evolution of the 2010 conflict; lastly, it considers the prospects for stability following the return to political processes.

Internal ‘conflictogenic’ factors

Flawed political reforms: In the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was a pioneer in the speed and scope of its political reforms and was hailed as ‘an island of democracy’. Yet from the outset there was a mismatch between good intentions and reality on the ground [3]. There was growing paralysis in government as rival factions blocked or subverted attempts to reform the system. Rather than address this issue — the flaws in the process — successive administrations tried to resolve the problem by tinkering with the constitution. This became a substitute for addressing substantive social and economic issues. Moreover, political activism became an end in itself — a lucrative career path devoid of any concept of public service or responsibility. The number of registered political parties mushroomed, but rather than participating in a constructive democratic debate, most of the party leaders were preoccupied with their personal ambitions [2]. Bribery and corruption became ingrained. The ‘Tulip Revolution’ of March 2005 promised a new beginning, but it merely changed the faces of the leaders, not the flawed nature of governance.

Economic restructuring: Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to create a Western-oriented, free market economy were haphazard and inconsistent. The most serious long-term effect was that the country’s manufacturing base was virtually wiped out by the influx of cheap foreign imports. With careful planning and some initial state support many of these enterprises would probably have survived. As it was, when they closed down, jobs were irrevocably lost, as were skills and work practices. The situation in the agricultural sector was even worse. Traditionally, the mainstay of the Kyrgyz economy had always been animal husbandry. The rapid privatization of this sector dismembered the large collective farms and at the same time destroyed the vital support services that they provided. Inputs such as fuel for agricultural machinery, seeds, fertilisers, winter fodder, veterinary services — these and many other basic facilities were now beyond the reach of the new smallholders and herders. The animals were soon slaughtered, the land left untended — and the rural population drifted to the towns in search of non-existent work.

Declining social services: From the early 1990s onwards, there was a steep decline in the public provision of social care, health and education. The better-off urbanites generally had the means to cushion themselves against this decline in state-funded services. For the poorer (and by far the more numerous) rural sections of the population, it was a catastrophic blow. Deprived of access to basic welfare services, they tended

to seek help from other sources — mostly religious organizations. This socio-economic divide resulted in the creation of parallel worlds, separated by an invisible but impenetrable wall.

The most alienated sector of the population today is the rural youth. Those aged 30 years and younger have grown up in a world of limited access to education and shrinking employment opportunities [6]. Deracinated and disoriented, they are at high risk of being drawn into extremist religious or criminal groups. This problem was recognised by the Bakiev government and measures were taken to address it. The aims were exemplary, but remained largely unfulfilled. Post-Bakiev, a similar process was re-launched. However, such initiatives were generally targeted at the educated urban youth. They rarely reach the marginalized, disaffected young people who formed the bulk of the population [13].

Erosion of civic identity: In parallel to the deepening political and economic problems, there was a rise in ethno-nationalism. This was partly the result of increased competition for scarce resources. The Kyrgyz, as the ‘titular people’, felt an entitlement to ownership of the country’s wealth. Directly and indirectly, this was encouraged by successive governments, who elevated all things Kyrgyz — language, myths and iconic symbols — while at the same time circumscribing the cultural rights of minorities [10]. This inevitably created friction and resentment. Concomitantly, the concept of a civic identity was eroded as ethnicity became the paramount marker of identity.

North/south divide: Ethnic divisions were further accentuated by geography. A central ridge of high mountains bisects the country, creating a physical barrier between north and south [15]. This is reflected in the differences in mental outlook and lifestyles. The south, located on the ancient Silk Roads, had for centuries been home to a cosmopolitan, multi-lingual population. The great majority of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, or ‘Kyrgyz-Uzbeks’ [12] live in this part of the country, mostly in compact communities in towns and villages. The north, by contrast, was historically more isolated and inward-looking; traditionally, the population in this part of the country was predominantly Kyrgyz. In modern times, the north has been the seat of government and also of the main political and cultural institutions.

In recent years the socio-economic demographic balance in the south has been changing. There is high unemployment in the countryside, resulting in a massive drift to the towns in search of work. These migrants, mostly rural Kyrgyz, came to resent the prosperity of the established urban dwellers, many of whom were Kyrgyz-Uzbeks. Economic problems were thus transmuted into ethnic resentment. The situation was further inflamed by opportunistic local politicians who exploited these grievances in order to bolster their own popularity.

Dynamics of the conflict cycle: april-june 2010

It was against this background of multiple tensions that a cycle of conflict unfolded in 2010. The first phase took place in early April and was centred in Bishkek. The clashes here were primarily intra-Kyrgyz. There were two distinct, though concurrent, strands. One was a crime wave, characterized by the ransacking of property and savage attacks, some lethal, on random victims; a few ethnic minorities were attacked, but the

motive seems to have been mainly criminal-economic. The second strand was a protest against President Bakiev and his government. This, at least in intention, was peaceful. Almost immediately, however, the two strands merged: criminal elements mingled with the crowds, leading to outbreaks of violence. Thereupon the security forces opened fire, with predictable results. Over a thousand people were injured, almost 100 fatally. President Bakiev fled to his political stronghold in southern Kyrgyzstan and an Interim Government (IG), headed by Roza Otunbayeva, was formed. On 16 April Bakiev resigned and left the country.

The second phase began on 13 May, in the southern town of Jalal-Abad. The clashes here incorporated ethnic, political and criminal rivalries. The Kyrgyz-Uzbek community, who had seen their rights eroded under Bakiev, supported the IG. Many of the local Kyrgyz, however, remained loyal to ex-President Bakiev, a native of Jalal-Abad. Moreover, many of Bakiev's family still held prominent positions in the local security services, administrative apparatus and commercial sphere. There was a power struggle as the pro-Bakiev faction tried to oust the newly appointed representatives of the IG. They were repelled by a group of armed Kyrgyz-Uzbeks, supporters of the IG. The official death toll was relatively low (under 10, with some 150 injured), but massive material damage was inflicted, overwhelmingly to Kyrgyz-Uzbek property. Yet the IG, scarcely a month old, could not afford to alienate the majority Kyrgyz community and quickly distanced itself from its Kyrgyz-Uzbek supporters (a warrant was issued for the arrest of six Kyrgyz-Uzbek leaders, on the grounds of criminal actions). Thus, although the confrontation was ostensibly political, it immediately assumed an ethnic aspect.

The third phase, too, was played out in the south. It began on the night of 9—10 June and escalated rapidly, reaching a peak on 13 June; thereafter the violence subsided, though punctuated by sporadic clashes. The epicentre of the conflict was Osh, but nearby towns and villages were also badly affected. Unlike the earlier clashes, there were no political overtones. The conflict was overtly inter-ethnic and characterized by extreme criminal behaviour. It is clear that the violence was premeditated and that both communities had been stockpiling arms, but the overwhelming advantage in terms of weapons, vehicles and control of key facilities lay with the Kyrgyz. Many people suffered serious injuries and the devastation of homes and infrastructure was colossal. The death toll was officially set at around 470, but unofficial estimates suggested a figure of at least 2,000. There were numerous Kyrgyz casualties but the overwhelming majority of the victims were Kyrgyz-Uzbeks. Horrendous sexual attacks were also reportedly perpetrated on Kyrgyz-Uzbek women. Almost 110,000 Kyrgyz-Uzbeks sought asylum in Uzbekistan; another 300,000 people, also mostly Kyrgyz-Uzbeks, were internally displaced [17].

Regional and international responses

Uzbekistan played a key role in halting the spread of violence. Given the tense relations between the two countries, it had seemed possible that Tashkent might exploit the situation to gain some tactical advantage. In fact, as acknowledged by the Kyrgyz government, the Uzbek authorities behaved in a 'responsible and balanced' manner, providing prompt humanitarian assistance [4]. This included setting up triage centres and providing food, shelter and medical care for the traumatised refugees [5]. As soon as the

situation in Kyrgyzstan was more stable, the Uzbek authorities facilitated the return of the refugees, enabling them to take part in the national referendum on 27 June. Importantly, Uzbek President Karimov publicly rejected ethnic explanations for the violence. Instead, he stressed the historic bonds between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and condemned impromptu revenge raids, making it clear that they would be severely punished [18]. This was crucial, since many Uzbek citizens, incensed by the vicious attacks on the refugees, wanted to take the law into their own hands and to carry out cross-border revenge attacks. Such actions would almost certainly have triggered an inter-state confrontation.

Two other countries that had a strong interest in the situation in Kyrgyzstan were Russia and the United States. Both regarded Kyrgyzstan as important to their strategic interests and both had military bases in the country. At the start of the June conflict there was much speculation as to how they would react — prompting some Western commentators to produce fanciful scenarios about Russian plans to re-conquer the region. In fact, keenly aware of the dangers of regional instability, they eschewed opportunistic competition in favour of pragmatic cooperation [7]. Neither Washington nor Moscow intervened directly in the conflict.

China, which borders Kyrgyzstan, was even more circumspect in its response. Official statements were limited to expressions of sympathetic concern and hopes for a speedy resolution of the conflict. Large quantities of emergency aid were sent in June. Beijing welcomed the referendum and formation of the new Kyrgyz government, because these actions re-established legality and stability. This was important, since it is a key tenet of China's foreign policy that it has official dealings only with legitimate state actors.

Aid from international humanitarian agencies was mobilised relatively quickly and began arriving in Kyrgyzstan on 16 June. The lead role was taken by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, but other organizations played a major part, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organisation. The regional security organizations were less effective. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation were prevented by their mandates from intervention in the domestic affairs of another state. Thus, they were able to provide humanitarian assistance, but not to undertake military or peace-keeping operations. The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), by contrast, was well placed to take action to avert, or at least mitigate, the crisis. It had been operating in Kyrgyzstan since January 1999, with a remit that prioritized the human and political aspects of security, specifically stressing the importance of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. Yet it singularly failed to anticipate the looming crisis. Its main achievement was to facilitate Bakiev's exodus from the country in mid-April.

Political process renewed

On 27 June 2010, scarcely a fortnight after the most violent clashes and massive displacement of large numbers of people, the Interim Government held a referendum to approve constitutional amendments. The aim was to replace the presidential system with a parliamentary system, thereby creating counterbalances by providing strong roles

for both the prime minister and the president. Many commentators, in Kyrgyzstan and abroad, believed that this move was premature, given the on-going instability in the country. Nevertheless, the referendum was not only held on schedule, but there were no disturbances and no allegations of fraud or mismanagement. It was, at least on the surface, a success. Around 70 per cent of the electorate took part, of which 90 per cent supported the change. Observers from the OSCE and other international bodies gave a highly positive assessment of the proceedings, endorsing the view that 'the will of the people had been clearly and honestly expressed'. Only Moscow sounded a note of caution. This was not surprising, since the foreign monitors were relatively few in number and had been deployed only in 'safe areas'. Also, it was abundantly clear from local interviews that the overwhelming majority of the voters did not understand what they were agreeing to, but were giving their assent in the hope that it would bring stability to the country — the same pattern of voting that had characterized previous ballots in Kyrgyzstan. (Cf. the results of the referendum on constitutional change called by President Akayev in 1996, for which there was a 96 per cent turn-out, with 94.5 per cent of the votes favouring the amendments.)

That the referendum was held at all was, under the circumstances, a considerable organisational achievement. Moreover, it brought clarity to the situation, mandating the adoption of a new constitution and legitimizing the interim government, which now became the 'caretaker government'. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for October 2010, followed by a presidential election a year later. Until then, Roza Otunbaeva was formally recognized as head of state. Theoretically, these arrangements were wise, providing time for the constitutional reforms to be implemented in an orderly fashion. In practice, however, they ushered in a period of uncertainty and political struggle. The most able deputies resigned from their posts in order to prepare for the election campaign; several formed their own parties. Thus, rather than creating a government of national unity that could concentrate on a crisis programme of reconstruction and reconciliation, the political establishment was again preoccupied with infighting and jockeying for position. Moreover, sporadic outbreaks of violence continued. Most of the casualties were Kyrgyz-Uzbeks. There were also numerous reports of the police summarily arresting and abusing Kyrgyz-Uzbeks. In a strongly worded statement, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights claimed that the police were arbitrarily detaining large numbers of people in ways that not only demonstrated flagrant ethnic bias, but also broke many of the fundamental tenets of both Kyrgyz and international law [9].

Elections

Parliamentary elections were held on 10 October in a relatively calm environment. The 120 seats in the new unicameral legislature were contested by 3,351 candidates, drawn from 29 parties. Overall, the proceedings were well organized and reasonably fair. Nevertheless, there were many accusations of electoral fraud, which delayed the announcement of the results for several weeks. Finally, it was confirmed that five parties had secured enough votes to cross the 5 per cent threshold: *Ata-Zhurt* 'Homeland' (8.4 per cent), Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (7.83 per cent), *Ar-Namys* 'Dignity' (7.57 per cent), *Respublika* 'Republic' (6.93 per cent), and *Ata-Meken* 'Fatherland'

(5.49 per cent). In late December, after much acrimonious wrangling and one failed attempt to form a coalition, a new alliance was created and a government was finally established. Headed by the Social Democrats, allied with *Ata-Zhurt* and *Respublika*, it held 77 seats. The other two parties officially formed the Opposition. The new prime minister was the Social Democrat Almazbek Atambaev.

Meanwhile, arrests and trials of the alleged ringleaders of the June conflict continued. Many of the cases appeared to be politically motivated, since most of the accused were either supporters of the ousted president or ethnic Uzbeks — the main victims of the violence [14]. Thus, although the security situation had improved and the country was largely stable, there were still deep resentments and unresolved antagonisms. Attempts at rebuilding inter-ethnic harmony and trust were stronger on promises than on action. This created fears that the present calm was a temporary lull, liable to be shattered at any time [11]. Equally disturbing was the inability of the new government to focus on the country's pressing socio-economic problems. The coalition limped from one crisis to another while the deputies argued amongst themselves, leaving draft laws to pile up and budget discussions to drag on for months. The only person who did appear to be taking the situation seriously during this period was interim President Roza Otunbaeva, who won admiration for her efforts to reform the state apparatus, albeit with limited success.

From mid-2011 onwards, there was a new distraction for the deputies as hopeful candidates began to prepare their campaigns for the presidential election, scheduled for 30 October. Some 83 candidates sought registration — not only politicians, but also farmers, businessmen, teachers and the unemployed. However, the great majority failed to qualify for various reasons, and by polling day the list had been reduced to 16. As expected, the winner was 56-year-old Almazbek Atambaev, leader of the Social Democrats and former prime minister (he had resigned in September in order to stand for the presidency). He gained some 63 per cent of the vote and, despite allegations of electoral fraud, was generally recognized as the popular choice (some 800 international observers and more than 100 journalists monitored the elections; the overall assessment was largely positive). Although born in northern Kyrgyzstan, he had strong support in the south and was a less divisive figure than some of his rivals, who had a more limited regional base. Politically, too, he was a known entity, since he had been active in Kyrgyz politics for some two decades and in 1993 had been one of the founder members of the Social Democratic Party. More recently, he had been one of Kurmanbek Bakiev's fiercest critics. For a population that was weary of chaos and instability, he seemed to offer the best hope of competent leadership and effective governance.

The largely positive impression created by the elections was further enhanced when Interim President Roza Otunbaeva stepped down as promised, in the country's first peaceful transfer of power. Yet there were signs of incipient fragility. Two days after the inauguration ceremony the government resigned in protest over proposed reforms. Shortly after, the speaker also resigned 'in order to maintain stability', though more probably his departure was linked to serious allegations of criminal ties [8]. In mid-December, the Social Democrats, supported by three of the largest parties, *Respublika*, *Ata-Meken*, and *Ar-Namys*, established a new, but still uneasy, coalition. The *Ata-Jurt* faction formed the parliamentary opposition.

Despite these problems, President Atambaev began his term of office with a statesman-like display of goodwill towards his political opponents. His new government included several individuals who had held portfolios in previous administrations. Some of these appointments may have been a politically motivated move to mollify potential rivals, but they could also be seen as an indication of a genuine desire to choose the most capable people for the task in hand. He was likewise quick to signal his intention to build good relations with neighbouring states, as well as with the 'big powers' — Russia, China and the USA. The main emphasis was on the strategic relationship with Russia which, he stressed, was in Kyrgyzstan's national interest. At the same time, he was careful to maintain cordial relations with the other two great powers. Nevertheless, he insisted that the US Transit Centre at Manas airport would have to be closed by 2014. This facility had long been a source of contention and there had been previous attempts to close it, notably in February 2009, during President Bakiev's term of office. However, on each occasion Bishkek had been persuaded (partly by the payment of higher fees) to reverse its decision. This time President Atambaev seemed determined to see the closure of the base, deeming it a threat to the security of Kyrgyzstan since it heightened the risk of retaliatory attacks from militant Islamist groups within the region and from further afield. Whether or not he would be able to achieve his goal was, however, uncertain. Given the vital role played by the Manas base in transporting NATO-ISAF operations in Afghanistan (it handled some 15,000 servicemen and 500 tons of cargo a month) it was probable that negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable arrangement would eventually take place.

Looking ahead

The traumatic events of 2010 had left deep physical as well as psychological scars. Worse, this was not a single, one-off episode, but a stage in a series of violent clashes that had taken place over a period of some two decades. Thus, the real, immensely hard, challenge that faced Kyrgyzstan as it sought to recover from the recent upheavals was whether or not it could break this destructive cycle. There were grounds for hope: the successful conduct of the June 2010 referendum was a signal achievement. Likewise the orderly and relatively fair conduct of two rounds of elections, parliamentary and presidential, in October 2010, and October 2011 respectively, were positive developments. They were a good beginning and gave grounds for guarded optimism. However, to justify the hopes that had been invested in the new parliamentary system it was not enough to create a theoretical blueprint for a stronger, more representative and transparent political process. Rather, the government and the opposition together would have to implement the social and economic reforms that were so urgently needed. These included a strategy to overcome the inherent conflictogenic factors mentioned above, as well as measures to address immediate concerns. Key issues were food security; housing and welfare support for displaced persons; restoring inter-ethnic harmony and rebuilding trust; job creation; refurbishment and development of transport networks; and reform of the energy sector. This last item was perhaps the most challenging. Heavily subsidized by the state, this sector was notoriously inefficient and riddled with corruption. In January 2010 Bakiev had tried to phase in higher tariffs, a deeply unpopular move that un-

doubtedly contributed to his downfall. By 2011, the system was close to collapse and urgently required capital refurbishment.

As this brief survey has indicated, President Atambaev and his new government inherited an exceptionally difficult situation. However, the early signs were that they understood the challenges that lay ahead and were ready to take tough, but necessary, decisions to address complex social and economic problems. At the start of 2012 it was too soon to speak of an irreversible recovery, but there was a hope that the future would bring stability and genuine reform. There was still a danger that politicians might allow themselves to be distracted by internal squabbles, or that they would choose the easy option of resorting to populist gestures. The result would be that the country would slip from one crisis to the next and that the cycle of violence would be repeated. Yet after the traumas of 2010, people were tired of strife and upheaval. They were prepared to give the government a chance to prove that it could deliver real progress. If it succeeded in doing this, Kyrgyzstan would indeed be set on the path to a brighter future.

NOTES

- [1] This paper is based in part on a longer, more detailed report “Kyrgyzstan: A Regional Analysis” (S. Akiner, August 2010), written by the same author for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Emergency Preparedness and Response Section.
- [2] Политические партии в Кыргызстане / Под ред. М. Иманалиева. — Бишкек: Институт общественной политики, 2006.
- [3] *Anderson J.* Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy? — Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999; see also: *Huskey E.* Kyrgyzstan: The Fate of Political Liberalization // Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus / K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, eds. — Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. — Pp. 242—276.
- [4] Comments by the Government of Kyrgyzstan: In response to the report of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission into the events in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 // www.k-ic.org/images/stories/kg_comments_english_final
- [5] Final Report on UNHCR Emergency Operations In the Republic of Uzbekistan. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Geneva, 23 July 2010 // <http://www.unhcr.org/4c51717a6.html>; see also: Refugee Crisis Poses Challenge for Uzbekistan // *Eurasianet*. 14 June 2010 // <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61303>
- [6] For an analysis of problems in the education sector, see: *Scott D.* From Central Planning to Market Economy: Conceptual and Practical Challenges in the Education Sector in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2007 (unpublished).
- [7] <http://eng.24.kg/politic/2010/06/25/12288.html>
- [8] http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan_parliament_speaker_quits_alleged_criminal_ties/24419845.html
- [9] Illegal Acts by Security Forces Threaten Fragile Peace in Southern Kyrgyzstan, Says UN Human Rights Chief // United Nations. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Geneva, 20 July 2010 // <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10220&LangID=E>
- [10] In 1994, Akayev established the Assembly of the Peoples of Kyrgyzstan to create a formal channel through which the minorities could raise their concerns. However, he was ousted from power shortly after and under Bakiev, the Assembly failed to fulfil its potential. — See: *Amanov T.* Kyrgyzstan: People’s Assembly Disappoints // *IWPR Reporting Central Asia*. No 460. 11 August 2006 // <http://iwpr.net/report-news/kyrgyzstan-people’s-assembly-disappoints>.

- [11] *Karimov D.* Kyrgyzstan 2010: loop? // Daniyar Bishkek — 24.kg news agency. 30 December 2010 // <http://eng.24.kg/politic/2010/12/30/15632.html>
- [12] Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic state. In this paper the hyphenated prefix ‘Kyrgyz-Uzbek’ has been adopted when there is a need for ethnic differentiation, as opposed citizenship. It is a clumsy device, but the point it makes is a vital one, since these are not ‘outsider’ communities, but full citizens of Kyrgyzstan.
- [13] *Marchenko I.* Youth Policy in Kyrgyzstan: Stiff Mission. 16 March 2010 // <http://eng.24.kg/politic/2010/03/16/10616.html>; *Bennett D.* Kyrgyz Youth Activists Struggle to Find Place in Bishkek’s New Order // Eurasianet. 24 May, 2010 // <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61137>
- [14] *Najibullah F.* New Year Brings New Fears In Kyrgyzstan’s Troubled City Of Osh // Eurasianet.org. 26 December 2010 // http://www.rferl.org/content/osh_kyrgyzstan_tensions_new_years/2259433.html.
- [15] *Pannier B.* Future Kyrgyz Government Faces Traditional North-South Divide // Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 26 April 2010 // http://www.rferl.org/content/Future_Kyrgyz_Government_Faces_Traditional_NorthSouth_Divide/2025131.html
- [16] *Pannier B.* The Third Force and Reconciliation // Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 2 July 2010 // http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Third_Force_And_Reconciliation_Kyrgyzstan_Osh/2089210.html
- [17] Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 // <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63405>, pp. 44—45. — The Independent International Commission of Inquiry was led by Kimmo Kiljunen, Special Representative for Central Asia, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Based on extensive field research, the Report gives the most detailed account of the conflict to date, though some of its findings are disputed by the Kyrgyz authorities.
- [18] Statement by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Events in Kyrgyzstan. Bukhara. 18 June 2010 // http://www.uzbekembassy.org/r/press_releases/13287/

КЫРГЫЗСТАН В 2010—2011 ГОДАХ: ОТ КОНФЛИКТА К ХРУПКОЙ СТАБИЛЬНОСТИ

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Кыргызстан был вынужден проводить сложные системные изменения, последовавшие после распада Советского Союза, когда страна пошла по пути быстрых социальных, экономических и политических перемен. В данной статье обобщаются основные факторы, приведшие к созданию подверженного кризисам общества, анализируется эволюция конфликта 2010 года, наконец, рассматриваются перспективы стабильности, которая может последовать за политическими процессами. Автор изучает реакцию региональных и мировых держав на кризис в Кыргызстане.

Ключевые слова: Кыргызстан, киргизский конфликт 2010 года, политическое развитие, государственное управление, этнические сообщества, парламентские выборы, президентские выборы.