
THE RULING FORMER NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ZIMBABWE, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA AND CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, BROAD PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Ndali — Che Kamati

The concept of national reconciliation became policy strategies in political discourse in Zimbabwe and Namibia after independence and South Africa after democratisation. The objective was to avoid the civil war experienced in neighbouring Angola and Mozambique after independence. Current argument however is that reconciliation mainly harmonising relations between blacks and whites and between the new government and capital is not sufficient. It is argued that reconciliation should fundamentally extend to the formerly deprived black majority the right of access to natural resource and addresses their economic well being. Political processes and developments in these three countries also reveal that settlement compromises made at independence and new democratic dispensation predicated on liberal constitutions followed by neo-liberal economic policies are sources of enormous governance challenges facing the leadership of these countries today.

Key words: Challenges of National Reconciliation, Participatory Democracy and Good Governance.

When Zimbabwe and Namibia got independence and a new democratic dispensation achieved in South Africa, these countries inherited systems of acute inequality. That inequality permeated throughout all structures of social, economic, cultural, administrative, and indeed the political sphere and, therefore, all the concepts of power. This is extremely challenging and a mammoth task for the leadership of national liberation movements [NLMs] just emerging from the situation of liberation war to redress and change such inhumane systems of institutionalised violation of basic human rights and freedoms.

One of the most challenging aspects immediately requiring political intervention is the unity of the people and to maintain the territorial integrity of these young states. This is because the apartheid colonial regimes in especially Namibia and South Africa deliberately institutionalised a bantustan system of divide and rule where by different races, ethnic groups and tribes were forcefully separated and lived apart with differently graded social, economic, educational and cultural benefits.

The philosophy of racial segregation and separate development of these apartheid colonial regimes had the main objective to sow and breed hatred amongst racial and ethnic groups. At the same time the war for independence in these three countries witnessed both warring parties recruiting supporters from each group of the population. The Namibian Prime Minister and Vice-President of SWAPO Hage Geingob [currently nominated also to run for presidency of Namibia in November 2014] argued that ‘when SWAPO decided to promote reconciliation, its primary objective was to lay the ground work for peace and harmony in a country that was ravaged by long years of war. It was an attempt to heal the wounds created by hatred between blacks and whites, between father and son, and between families [1. P. 70—71]. Many of you will recall, Geingob stressed, ‘that it is not unusual for one person from a family to be a member of Koevoet, [then the most notorious special para-military unit, officially denoted by the colonial regime

as the South West Africa Police [SWAPOL]’s Counter Insurgency Unit [SWAPOL-COIN], and the other a fighter for freedom and independence with SWAPO. Only an attempt at reconciliation, Hage continued, could restore peace and harmony at various levels of our society. We saw no alternative [2. P. 70—71]. To succeed in healing wounds, and to create a stable atmosphere for unity, stability and socio-economic development, such a situation required a meaningful reconciliatory approach after independence and majority rule was achieved.

President Robert Mugabe and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU-PF] immediately saw the danger created by the colonial legacy and therefore the urgent necessity to address it at independence in 1980. He proclaimed national reconciliation to accommodate the whites and all former foes.

He stated that ‘if yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interests, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. If ever we look to the past, let us do so for the lesson that history has taught us, namely, that oppression and racism are inequities that must never again find scope in our political and social system. It could never be a correct approach that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil whether practiced by white against black or by black against white [3]. Mugabe went on to assure the white community that there would be no reprisals and no victimisation and that the guiding principle of the government policy, thereafter, would be one of reconciliation. That was necessary not only to heal the wounds but most importantly to create conditions for peace and stability, and get everyone to work towards and contribute to the socio-economic national development.

Mugabe’s inaugural speech on 18 April 1980 promised reconciliation between blacks and whites. It also captured the desire of all black communities to fully participate in the new dispensation. Independence would mark the end of all forms of discrimination: racial, tribal, gender and religious. This was the legitimate expectation of the black oppressed majority. For the first time, they had a government that belonged to all. In many ways independence did bring the beginning of democratic political structures and practices. The participation of blacks, women and youth in social, political and economic structures was evident. Schools, hospitals and clinics became open to all. Support for the liberation effort had come from many sides and people did not need party cards to prove this.

When Namibia attained independence ten years later, SWAPO followed suit to proclaim national reconciliation. During his inaugural address on 21 March 1990, President Sam Nujoma pointed out that ‘the independence of Namibia has been achieved under conditions of national consensus and international unanimity. Now that this country is in our own hands, it means among other things, making the great effort to forge national identity, reconciliation and unity. Our collective security and prosperity depends on our unity of purpose, action and reconciliation. Nujoma added, unity is a pre-condition for peace and development’ [4].

The same reconciliation policy was declared in South Africa when apartheid was dismantled in 1994 and new democratic dispensation ushered in under the leadership of the African National Congress [ANC]. The first president of a democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela, during his inauguration stated that ‘the moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come. The time for the healing of the wounds has come. We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans both black and white, will be able to walk tall without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity — a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world [5].

My contest, however, is that national reconciliation is not enough and indeed meaningless if it is not implemented within result oriented inclusive democratic space. While it requires that all citizens should be accorded equality, protection and security before the law, it is also an imperative that all and every one should demonstrate honesty, loyalty, patriotism and commitment to contribute to the building of the common nation state.

In this connection Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa is quite correct in asserting that ‘in each of our nation-states we should work to nurture and cultivate a common sense of nationhood and a shared patriotism. Our nation-states are constituted as diverse societies. It is therefore imperative that a conscious and sustained intervention is made to give practical expression to the principle and vision of achieving unity in diversity [6]. In my opinion it is of fundamental importance, however, that national reconciliation should not only apply to and end with efforts to create harmony between races, blacks and whites, ethnic groups etc, but most fundamentally, it should also extend to economic resources, to material well-being especially for the formerly deprived and disadvantaged majority of the African masses. Therefore, equity in access to social, economic and cultural resources, including social security and employment should be the guiding principle of reconciliation.

All citizens, including former foes, should be free to participate in the governance processes as well as political activities affecting their lives and lives of their children and future generations.

Suffice to stress here that the attainment of independence or majority rule and democracy in these three countries came as a result not only of armed struggle and popular mass political pressure but also through negotiated settlements.

During the critical moment when the ANC was conducting discussions on constitutional principles and different scenarios before engaging the apartheid regime in direct negotiations at CODESA, the late Kader Asmal noted that ‘in the event of a violent overthrow or popular insurrection, the new constitution would be imposed on terms of the victor. However, if the constitution came about through negotiation, then it would obviously effect the give-and-take compromises that are part and parcel of negotiation’ [7. P. 108—109].

The circumstances under which the independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia and a new democratic dispensation in South Africa were achieved the seizure of power happened without sufficient revolutionary basis that would have given the NLMs enough

power to warrant intervention in substantial socio-economic sphere of the society. Hence the imperative need for national reconciliation. The lack of capacity in extending such reconciliation to material and productive resources embracing the hitherto deprived poor black majority remains a big challenge.

Challenges of social transformation broad democratic participation and governance.

Henning Melber, a political analyst and researcher on Southern Africa correctly observes when referring to Namibia that, having attained independence under circumstances of negotiated settlement and compromise where the principle yardstick was that of give and take, very often than not, ‘the structural legacy of settler colonialism remained alive in place [8. P. 13—14]. This observation is also true with regard to the process of achievement of independence in Zimbabwe and new democratic dispensation in South Africa. This brought about one of the major obstacles to the implementation of profound structural changes of political culture required for the radical socio-economic transformation.

It is evident, as we have witnessed that given such circumstances in the course of these manifold and complex interrelated processes, vested interests are often re-established. The original goals of NLMs formulated during the liberation struggle calling for radical social transformation after achievement of independence are either compromised or totally abandoned as a result of neo-liberal influences. Such development plays in favour of newly emerging diverge class interests within the ranks of the former national liberation revolutionaries.

These circumstances sooner rather than later create a fertile ground for the emergence of nationalist political elite whose class interests matches and fuses with that of the colonial former rulers. These new nationalist elites tend to protect their new class interests using the obtaining instruments and laws until recently exercised by the colonial regime.

President Robert Mugabe and the leadership of ZANU-PF especially have been accused and heavily criticised for initiating and implementing some highly restrictive laws. Two of the most outspoken of such laws, which widely outraged the population, especially the ‘civil society’, are the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) [9] and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [AIPPA] [10]. Since its enactment, in 2002, the Public Order and Security Act has been perceived as an instrument used by government to detain, intimidate and victimise pro-democracy actors such as labour activists, students, civil society activists and the generality of Zimbabweans. Critics assert that the government hurriedly passed these two bills, which significantly curtailed civil liberties. ‘POSA increased governments’ sweeping powers of detention. All these were done in the run up to the 2002 Presidential elections [11. P. 40]. The ‘civil society’ leaders who incessantly demanded the repeal of POSA argued that in just one year of its enactment, ‘several thousand citizens have been unlawfully arrested and detained. They argued that this number far exceeds the arrests made under Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) the predecessor of POSA used by Ian Smith’s colonial regime in the late 1970’s, a time when the country was at war [12].

These unpopular measures did cause a lot of disillusionment and disgruntlement within the ranks of the former liberation movement and tend to negatively affect the

trust the broad masses have in the party and its leadership. Welshman Ncube of the Movement for Democratic Change [MDC], now of a break away faction, the Movement for Democratic Change-Ncube [MDC-N], went to the extreme and stated then that 'these two Bills when taken together complete the transition from a form of democracy to a total dictatorship and fascist state [13. P. 40].

We have noticed that, some leaders in attempt to prevent open discussion of policies and crucial issues and to stifle broad participation of the majority in the process of governance develop tendencies of suppression of popular will.

In November 2004 this tendency surfaced in ZANU-PF when President Mugabe decided to prevent the candidacy of Emmerson Mnangagwa who was democratically vying for the position of vice-president of ZANU-PF and of the country. Although Mnangagwa got the nod of six out of ten ZANU-PF political provinces, President Mugabe moved swiftly against those party members of the leadership who had sought to democratically exercise their right to nominate a candidate of their choice and suspended all six provincial ZANU-PF chairmen who had been present at a meeting in a town called Tsholotsho which affirmed the support for Mnangagwa. 'Mnangagwa was also deposed as Party Secretary of Administration — effectively the party's secretary general [14]. The 'Tsholotsho saga' continues to reverberate today through ZANU-PF's succession and internal politics.

One of the aspects that have been inflicting serious damage on the character of ZANU-PF and the government of Zimbabwe is electoral political violence. The laws enacted and applied by the government in Zimbabwe to guide elections before 2008 have been the subject of criticism and vilification.

The main political contenders in Zimbabwean elections since the year 2000 have been ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC. The MDC split into two factions in 2005, among other factors, over controversy whether to contest senate elections. It split into Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai [MDC-T], the larger faction still led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara [MDC-M], a smaller faction then led by Arthur Mutambara who was latter replaced by Welshman Ncube, hence MDC-N.

Opponents of President Mugabe maintain that although for the first time, since its emergence as the new opposition party, MDC, particularly in its two formations, could officially accumulate more votes than the ruling ZANU-PF, the elections and their results were not enough to effect a change of power as the MDC and its external backers hoped. One of the examples cited was the uncertain outcome of the first round of March 2008 presidential elections which failed to deliver an unambiguous outright presidential victory.

During the 2008 harmonised election President Robert Mugabe lost control of the parliament for the first time since independence in 1980. MDC-T won 99 seats while Mugabe's ZANU-PF won 97 seats including one for an MP who was elected unopposed. The breakaway MDC-M faction won 10 seats. One seat went to an independent candidate.

It has been claimed that the June 2008 run-off was characterised by unprecedented violence, which forced the opposition candidate to withdraw. Although violence during

elections happened ‘the election took place anyway with a single candidate, the incumbent who was proclaimed victorious [15]. It is important to point out that before March 2008 the president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki and his team facilitated conditions, which were agreed upon by all parties for conducting parliamentary and presidential elections. Thus the run-off election was also conducted under the same new conditions facilitated by Thabo Mbeki as mediator of the Southern African Development Community [SADC]. This in itself was the first real step towards a political settlement after many years of heavy criticism of the government and ZANU-PF due to violent elections.

Thabo Mbeki and his colleagues in the government had been quietly but steadily working hard on behalf of SADC for a political solution of the Zimbabwean crisis. Although he faced a barrage of criticism for being ‘too soft’ on Mugabe, he often expressed his readiness to promote compromise between the government and opposition in Zimbabwe but was not going to be persuaded to push for regime change. ‘He insistently required that the MDC accept and recognise Robert Mugabe was the president of Zimbabwe, and that MDC accept the 2002 presidential election results which was all along one of the crucial sticking points [16].

The mediation of Mbeki led to the signing of what came to be known as Global Political Agreement [GPA] on 15 September 2008, signed by ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M in the presence of SADC leaders.

The main objective of negotiations between these parties and signing the GPA was to seek to resolve the challenges that they faced as a country and the multiple threats to the well being of the Zimbabwean people. After many months of difficult negotiations and foot dragging, the parties reached agreement to form an ‘inclusive government’. It is important to point out that in reaching the agreement the parties, among other things, ‘declared their commitment and determination to build a society free of violence, fear of intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption, and founded on justice, fairness, dignity and equality. They recognised and accepted that the Land Question has been at the core of the contestation in Zimbabwe, and in this connection, while differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution, acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land has taken place under a land reform program undertaken since 2000. They accepted the irreversibility of the said land acquisition and redistribution [17].

Further, the parties acknowledged that pursuant to the resolution of the Dar-es-Salaam Extra-Ordinary SADC Summit [18] of 28—29 March 2007 that called for dialogue between the government and opposition and mandated Thabo Mbeki to facilitate that dialogue, they negotiated and agreed on a Draft Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 18 Act; amendments to the Electoral Act; the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act; Public Order and Security Act and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Broadcasting Services.

The GPA agreement stipulates that the Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared among the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as provided for in the new Constitution amendment and legislation. The GPA contained, as one of the most important provisions, a joint demand ‘that all measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are facing Zimbabwe [19].

To revert back to the 2008 election, it suffices recalling assertions that the pre-election campaign in 2007 was characterised by 'government actions of physical attacks and general harassment of the opposition, continuous and consolidated virtual state monopolisation of the media [20]. The repeated threats up to the eve of elections by ZANU-PF and the position of the security forces 'that a non-ZANU-PF electoral verdict would be swept aside further exacerbated the tense pre-election conditions [21].

The report of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa [EISA], a non-governmental regional election observer organisation, asserts that 'the ruling party and its associated state security and paramilitary forces discarded the electoral edifice of civility and the degree of campaign etiquette that characterised the March 2008 election [22].

According to Sue Onslow, a senior researcher at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the School of Advanced Studies, University of London, ZANU-PF offers important parallels and insights into challenges, which confront the three former Southern African liberation movements as ruling parties in these three countries. 'These shared aspects include the importance of personality, ethnic and tribal politics which helped to shape the liberation movements during the struggle for independence [23]. It is also necessary to point at the important legacy of emphasis on solidarity that sometimes supersedes and cloaks the need for internal discussion and open debate, a tendency that has been gaining root in ZANU-PF and SWAPO. Furthermore, the role of the armed struggle and the exile culture left lasting influences.

These formative attitudes and experiences forged political culture which continued to play out in the domestic political arena post independence. Onslow maintains that ZANU-PF was that time facing a profound challenge to the legitimacy of its victory, and to the legitimacy of identity of the liberation movement itself. 'From 2000 the struggle in Zimbabwe constituted a 'battle for the state' and this battle is continuing to play out in present day Zimbabwe [24]. She chronicles some stages that the country has gone through since independence in 1980 and states that the process of centralising power took place in 'stop-start' phases: 'first, there was the period 1980—1987, leading to the 1987 unity accord after which PF-ZAPU was absorbed within ZANU-PF. This period of almost one-party state dominated the political scene until 1999, a period ended by the emergence of the MDC. In the third phase post-2000, ZANU-PF maintained its dominance by restructuring state power, and attempting to manipulate the constitution and the electoral process until the GPA of September 2008 [25]. The 'Inclusive Government' was finally implemented in February 2009. This period witnessed a four years steady growth in the economy. 'In 2009, the GDP grew by 5.8% in 2010 by 8.1% in 2011 by 9.3% [26] and by 4.4% in 2012 [27].

These positive developments were also demonstrated by the 31 July 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections in that country, which were variously characterised by T African regional observer organisations as having been 'fairly fair', [AU representative], 'generally reliable' and that 'the will of the people was sufficiently expressed' [SADC Observer Mission] [28].

The election was clearly won by President Mugabe by 61% of the vote as compared to 33.94% for Tsvangirai of MDC-T. Welshman Ncube of MDC-N formation got 2.68%

with leaders of two other small parties sharing the spoils. 'In the parliamentary elections ZANU-PF won 197 seats out of 270, MDC-T got 70 and MDC-N got 2 seats, with one independent Member of Parliament [29]. There are only three parties represented in the current parliament. The results of the July 2013 election put an end to the joint rule of the ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations.

ZANU-PF effectively used the period of co-governance to consolidate its party structures and systems, strengthen its networks and power. It also took advantage of divisions among and between the opposition parties. On the other hand the MDC-T let its party structures degenerate while at the same time ignoring constituency duties. The local government in particular, which was headed by MDC-T minister was tainted by corruption and characterized by poor delivery of goods and services. These are some of the factors, which led to the defeat of the opposition. Tsvangirai has just been suspended by his party.

Even though these elections were declared by African observer organisations as free, fair and sufficiently an expression of the will of the Zimbabwean electorate, the EU and other Western countries were still reluctant to accept the reality. They continued to maintain biased double standards and hesitant to remove sanctions they imposed on Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF and the government clearly regained the ground lost since the onset of the adoption of damaging International Monetary Fund [IMF]'s neo-liberal macro-economic policies in the form of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme [ESAP] in 1996 which was latter compounded by the government's own fast-track land reform of 2000.

Often political processes and developments in these countries are made difficult by tendencies of the leaders of former liberation movements who assume that their coming to power is an unchallengeable sacred right. They try to convince the public that their legitimacy to rule without challenge and with limited or guided democratic participation, 'stemmed from their emergence from the decolonisation process as democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people' [30. P. 10].

Such political developments and processes also led to assertions that some leaders of former liberation movements have also developed 'militant notions of inclusion or exclusion as factors in shaping their post-colonial national identities [31. P. 10—11].

Under such circumstances, it is asserted, that 'early post-independence notions of national reconciliation and slogans like 'unity in diversity' have give way to a 'politically correct' identity form defined by those in power along narrow 'we-they' or 'with-us-against-us' lines [32. P. 10—11].

These tendencies are particularly advanced through political sycophantism and cronyism, which often go hand in hand with covering up prevalent corrupt dealings sometimes implicating the powers that be.

Recognising the intoxicating influence of surrounding sycophants, Hage. Gein-gob noted that 'there can be attempts by presidential coteries to encourage the president to be over presidential [33. P. 105].

The sycophancy may be reflected in their behaviour of promoting omnipotence of the presidency.

It is obvious that many of the forces then involved in the struggle on the part of the liberation movement in these three countries had right 'expectation that the end result of the struggle required democracy as the basis of a lasting political system [34. P. 14].

A process that will bring about genuine socio-economic development and participatory democracy. It is also evident that this may not have become the understanding and conviction of some leading personalities within the high ranks of these NLMs.

For most leading personalities in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia it was not participatory democracy that formed the priority agenda, but independence and majority rule. It must be pointed out though that some of the undemocratic tendencies and practices emanate from the culture and traditions that were objectively acquired by the liberation movements in the course of the protracted liberation war.

During the liberation struggle the leadership of these movements had to operate under military command structures and the direction of the liberation struggle was more based on military discipline and unquestionable respect for the leader's order. This was an objective necessity otherwise the liberation struggle could not succeed.

That is why there has been arguments involving a growing recognition that armed liberation struggles operating along military lines in conditions of clandestine were not suitable breeding grounds for the Western type of liberal democracy. Such conditions were not suitable for establishing democratic systems of governance in post-independence and that the forms of resistance employed in the struggle were themselves organised on hierarchical and authoritarian lines. In this sense then, the new societies carried within them essential elements of the old system. Thus it should come as no surprise that aspects of the colonial system reproduces themselves in the struggle for its abolition and subsequently, in the concepts of governance applied in post-colonial conditions.

The exile traditions and practices continued in government as these liberation movements became ruling parties. Obviously, former exile leaders of the NLMs, ZANU-PF, SWAPO and the ANC sometimes find it not easy to convert to open democratic practices as required by the constitutions they have adopted under conditions of compromises. It is not in the tradition of the revolutionary movement engaged in a bitter protracted war of liberation to introduce and be guided by a Western liberal system of checks and balances, for it is the antithesis of the struggle.

In this connection, Edgar Tekere noted: 'We, in extolling Mugabe, as we did, at independence, forgot to put in place institutional arrangements that would ensure that the party was sustained by collective leadership, democratic discourse, adherence to the principles that fuelled our struggle for independence, and accountability. In the absence of such institutional arrangements, any one of us, and not just Mugabe, could have lost course and degenerated into a virtual dictatorship, buttressed by the current combination of political and economic patronage, and the threat of state brutality if one dared to defy the powers — that be [35. P. 149].

National reconciliation, problems of race relations and ethnicity.

Some leaders of former liberation movements continue to be haunted by imagined threats from white plots, by the possible return of apartheid colonialism and threats from mysterious but ubiquitous third forces.

Despite the lofty declarations of strategic policies of national reconciliation and unity in diversity, certain leaders of the former NLMs are still reluctant to include skilled members of the formerly advantaged groups of the society in the processes for socio-economic development. Such attitudes and practices are anchored in the colonial and apartheid legacy of racial and ethnic divide and hatred.

But not all leaders of the former NLMs have become vulnerable to this hate syndrome. Quite aware of the importance of unity, peace and stability in the country after many years of apartheid rule which arrogantly pitted black against white, aware of the skills needed to transform and rebuild the country in an all inclusive democratic manner, Thabo Mbeki stated: ‘Whites in this country have a particular obligation. You have expertise. We cannot build this country without that knowledge, without those skills, without that expertise. And we want you to take the leadership in building a new South Africa. We do not regard it as correct that the majority should oppress the minority [36].

Kgalema Motlanthe then deputy president of the ANC was one time displeased with and reprimanded Juluis Malema, as president of the ANC Youth League who criticised the dominance of some racial minorities in certain ministries and certain areas of competence in government. Motlanthe said: ‘if we raise matters crudely, then we ourselves will reinforce conservative and even racist views among people. If you say we cannot include in government Coloureds, Whites, Indians or other people who have requisite skills and experience, then you are sending us back many years. We need to be conscious of the divisive legacy of apartheid and the likely repercussions of what we say [37. P. 314].

Under normal circumstances, the successful implementation of transformation and development programmes would require the retention of old and experienced, of course patriotic, civil servants. This is necessary especially where black skilled cadres are not available or sufficient to fill the gap.

In this connection, Motlanthe, stated that ‘it is important to get the country to understand that we need the best available talent to come to fore because many people do not even apply for jobs since they are members of other political parties [38. P. 335].

But this nation building, the transformation and development processes are not only an ANC problem. All citizens must know that they have an equal chance for a post that requires skills and experience they possess and they must also commit to serve to the best of their ability regardless of who the political head is. Motlanthe emphasised that ‘the ANC [this includes also ZANU-PF and SWAPO-NCK] need to know and understand that the transformation of the apartheid state must reach a point soon where we target and reach out to the professionals regardless, and no doubt this merit driven approach, should intend beyond professional classes to include all other skilled workers [39. P. 239].

The programmes for reconstruction, transformation and development in these countries with broad participation can only be realised under conditions of genuine national reconciliation, peace and stability.

REFERENCES

- [1] *Geingob. H.G.* [Quoted in Groth 1995:178] cit. in *Re-examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Culture Since Independence*, ed. Henning Melber, Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2003.

- [2] Ibid.
- [3] *Mugabe R.* Statement at independence in 1980, address to the nation, 4 March 1980, Zimbabwe Department of Information. See also *The Chronicle* [Bulawayo], 18 April 1980.
- [4] *Nujoma S.* Inaugural Statement, 21 March 1990.
- [5] *Mandela N.* Inaugural Statement, 27 April 1994.
- [6] *Mbeki T.* Tasks of the African Progressive Movement//*The Thinker Magazine*, South Africa, January 2014 // URL: <http://www.thethinker.co.za/resources/59%20mbeki.pdf>.
- [7] *Asmal K.* Politics in My Blood, Jacana Media, 2011. [The late K. Asmal was a prominent leader in the anti-apartheid movement; a member of the ANC and former minister in the ANC led government].
- [8] *Melber H.* in *Re-examining Liberation in Namibia, Political Culture After Independence*, 2003, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003.
- [9] Public Order and Security Act [POSA] of 2002.
- [10] Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, [AIPPA] of 2002.
- [11] *Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa: The Unfinished Business of Democratic Consolidation*, ed. Henning Melber, HSRC Press [JCRS], 2003.
- [12] Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, a Memorandum presented to the Zimbabwe Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on 25th February 2003.
- [13] *Ncube W.* *Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa: The Unfinished Business of Democratic Consolidation*, ed. Henning Melber, HSRC Press [JCRS] 2003.
- [14] Author's own witness as Ambassador to Zimbabwe.
- [15] EISA Observer Report, 2008, p. 13.
- [16] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thabo_Mbeki#DialoguebetweenZanu-PF_and_MDC].
- [17] Global Political Agreement [GPA] for Zimbabwe 2008.
- [18] SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit, Dar-es-Salaam, 28—29 March 2007.
- [19] GPA 2008
- [20] EISA Observer Report, 2008 p. 13.
- [21] Ibid. p. 14.
- [22] Ibid. p. 15.
- [23] Onslow. S. *Zimbabwe And the Political Transition*, March 2001.
- [24] Ibid.
- [25] Ibid.
- [26] See *Global Finance*, 2012.
- [27] *Zimbabwe GDP Annual Growth Rate*, 2012.
- [28] Mhofu, 3013.
- [29] *My Zimbabwe*, 2013.
- [30] Cited in *Re-examining Liberation in Namibia; Political Culture Since Independence*, ed. Henning Melber, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003.
- [31] Ibid.
- [32] Ibid.
- [33] *Geingob H.G.* in *Constitutional Democracy in Namibia: A Critical Analysis After Two Decades*, Macmillan Education Namibia, 2010.
- [34] *Re-examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Culture Since Independence*, ed. Henning Melber, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003.
- [35] *Tekere E.* «2Boy» Z, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, SAPES Books 2006.
- [36] *The Sunday Times*. — London, Rich List, 2008.
- [37] *Motlanthe K.* *A Political Biography*, by Ebrahim Harvey, Jacana Media [Pty] Ltd, 2012.
- [38] Ibid.
- [39] Ibid.