THE MONASTERY AS A PATTERN FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF TIME:
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF MODERNIZATION PROCESSES

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The article examines the role of monasteries in the development of civilization, especially at the onset of modernization. Particular attention is focused on the development of scheduling and time management, in which they played an important part, and contributed to the promotion of a rationalization that has found application in various areas of modern society (production, military, education, medicine, etc.) Life in monasteries became an inspiration not only for practice but also for many utopian projects of social reform.

Key words: modernization, time scheduling, monastery, asceticism, rationalization, civilization, capitalism, manufacture, utopia.

Modernization has been regarded by thinkers such as Michel Foucault or Anthony Giddens as a process of the development of institutions co-ordinating the temporal, spatial and social dimension of human action. The development of the temporal order of social reality is today considered, for example in the works of Niklas Luhmann or Anthony Giddens, as one of the key questions for the understanding of the process of the formation of social structures.

The starting point for the following reflections on time and discipline is Norbert Elias's theory of the civilizing process, which focuses on mutual linkage between the development of the evolution of the personality structures and structure of behaviour of the individual (psychogenesis) and the evolution of social structures of inequality, power and order (sociogenesis). Elias regards psychogenesis as a process involving the gradual formation of psychological structures regulating the behaviour of the individual (in Freudian terminology these structures are conceived in terms of the super-ego). This process is characterized by the progressive repression of instincts and affects in human behaviour. The shift in the control of instincts and affects is at first the result of pressure from the outside, i.e. external restraint (Fremdzwang), but if this is to be permanent it must be transformed into self-restraint (Selbstzwang).
One of the questions raised by Elias in the context of his civilizational theory is that of time. For Elias, time is chiefly a problem of the sociology of knowledge [9]. He investigates the development of the understanding and definition of time from the early forms of society to the period of industrialism. The concepts used to define time have emerged over long centuries and their roots go deep into the past. They are influenced by two types of evolutionary process: the first relates to the human capacity for the intellectual creation of certain syntheses serving the purposes of chronological arrangement and synchronization, and the second relates to the development of societies themselves.

Civilizational theory provides a framework in which the forms of perception and recording of time may be interpreted as further examples of social pressures that are increasingly transformed into self-restraint and “self-control” [24. S. 64]. This is the perspective which we shall adopt in the following contribution on the question of time and discipline.

A whole series of social scientists had devoted attention to the problem of time before Elias (1). We can mention Karl Marx, for example, for whom time represented one of the fundamental factors in his economic-philosophical analyses. George Simmel considered the time structures conditioned by the movement of money and the corresponding forms of time consciousness. Werner Sombart drew attention to the fact that “modern capitalism” demands a high degree of precision and reliability in the measurement of time, and this affects consciousness and behaviour [25. S. 472—473]. For Lewis Mumford, the essential machine of the modern age is not the steam engine, but the clock. In his book “Technics and Civilization” (1934), we find an idea that we shall now develop: the notion that the medieval monks may be regarded as the pioneers of the modern relation to time (2).

According to Mumford, it was in the monasteries of the western lands that after the long period of insecurity and bloody confusion following the collapse of the Roman Empire, there first appeared the desire for power and order of a non-military character (3). In opposition to the instability of the secular world, the monasteries set up the iron discipline of the order. They became the milieux of a strictly ordered, regular and punctual life that is not natural to humanity. Appealing to Coulton and Sombart, Mumford argues that the Benedictines created what was essentially a large-scale working order, which was clearly the original founder of modern capitalism: “their order undoubtedly removed the curse from work and their huge technical undertakings perhaps even overshadowed warfare and deprived it of part of its charm”. Mumford goes on to suggest that the monasteries even helped to give human enterprise a regular social measure of time and the rhythm of a machine [18. S. 19—20].

Mumford’s ideas were not entirely original. Sombart, for example, had already pointed out that in the Middle Ages the need to measure and divide up time had emerged only in the monasteries [22. S. 127]. Sombart, however, had interpreted the requirement for precise time measurement primarily in the context of the development of accounting and systematic book-keeping which emerged among Italian merchants and traders of the 14th and 15th centuries.

Sombart regarded the rise of capitalism as a process in which the chief elements were the accumulation of capital and the appearance of a capitalist spirit, and he found
the beginnings of this process in later medieval Italy (this theory of the genesis of capitalism differs somewhat from that of Marx, for example). His emphasis on the importance of the formation of the “capitalist spirit”, and the complex long-term psychogenesis of capitalism is characteristic, since Sombart's scholarship was distinctive for its efforts to correct the concept of the genesis of capitalism as formulated by Marx, by arguing with an analysis of the psychological basis of the process, and investigating the psychological forces that became the moving forces of economic development. (In this context we should note that Georg Simmel had a similar aim in his work “The Philosophy of Money” which he originally intended to call “The Psychology of Money” [16. S. 123]) This tendency finds its fullest expression, of course, in Sombart's contemporary, Max Weber, who carried on extensive discussions with Sombart on the nature of this process. Sombart linked the acceleration of the development of capitalism primarily with the Renaissance and Jewry, while Weber connected it with the Reformation.

The question of the moving forces of the expansion of modern capitalism was likewise, for Weber, not so much a matter of the origin of the capitalist method of making money (i.e. the original accumulation of capital) as a matter of the development of the capitalist spirit [29. S. 297—298]. Weber conceived this spirit of capitalism as bearing the features of a certain historical type of mentality, joined to a certain ethical orientation and with characteristic attitudes and modes of behaviour. Among the essential features of a world penetrated and formed by this spirit were rationalization, discipline, calculability, and precision in the organisation of affairs and in treatment of time. Weber’s spirit of capitalism is characterized by continuous effort in the service of the task to which the individual is assigned (called), the shifting of all individual needs into the background, unceasing application of discipline and method, and a universal rationalistic organizing approach to all areas of life. The enemy with whom the spirit of capitalism had to contend — as a particular style of life emerging in the garb of an “ethic” and bound to norms — was the mode of feeling and acting that Weber called traditionalism (man “naturally” does not want to make more and more money, but simply to live the life he is used to and to acquire as much as is necessary for the purpose [29. S. 288]).

Weber's concept of rationality was in many respects new and original. In contrast to the usual attitudes of the time, Weber did not believe the western rationality of his period to be the only possible type of rationality. In his view, the specific character of modern rationality had developed from earlier organizational forms at a particular degree of development. Contradicting the ideas that identified religion with irrationality, Weber regarded religion as the bearer of its own rationality. Hence, for Weber, historical development was not some kind of progress represented by an ever-advancing secular rationality but, on the contrary, modern rationality has its own necessarily religious roots. In the context of the other religions that Weber had studied, he saw the unique character of Christianity in a tendency to active behaviour. While he devoted the greatest attention to Protestantism, he believed that the roots of modern rationality went back significantly further, and for this reason he also directed his studies to pre-reformationary Catholicism.

Weber's seminal work “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” (4) was inspired by the statistical discovery that the greatest advances of capitalism had occurred
in countries where Protestantism had prevailed. This led Weber to the idea that a key role should be attributed to ascetic Protestantism of the Calvinist-Puritan type. Calvinism did not see man as master of his own destiny. The fate of every individual was pre-ordained by God and nobody could know whether he was predestined to salvation or to eternal damnation. In Weber’s view, it was just this feeling of insecurity and doubt about one’s own destiny in eternity that stimulated strenuous activities on earth. In the success of his secular endeavours the Calvinist could see proof of God’s favour.

Weber argued that the crucial mark of Calvinist-Puritan piety was an active “inner-worldly” asceticism (*innerweltliche Askese*, i.e. in-the-world as opposed to “other-worldly”), based on Calvinist belief in predestination. A rational-ascetic, disciplined and systematically organised way of life, continuous self-control, a life of self-denial and the subjection of all affects and sensuality to a self-conscious, vigilant and volitional self-mastery — this was what distinguished the elect from the damned, with their un-regulated lives and attitude of surrender to the world.

In “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” Weber devoted a great deal of attention to English Puritanism (which had developed out of Calvinism), and especially to the views of one of its exponents, Richard Baxter. In this context, Baxter's ideas on time are especially interesting. Baxter preached a gospel of hard, unremitting physical or intellectual work. God’s providence had assigned to each man a particular calling (in German *Beruf*), which each had to recognise and in which he must labour. For Baxter, wasting time was the worst of sins. No idle moments, but only active effort served to multiply the glory of God, and each wasted hour undermined this work. Life was infinitely short and precious, and the loss of time on entertainment, “idle talk”, luxury, or even sleeping longer than necessary for health — 6 or at the most 8 hours — was morally absolutely despicable [29. S. 314—315].

The “calling” or vocation, and work in one’s calling were for Protestantism something that possessed a religious quality; it is the way to godly living. For Luther, the division of people into estates and callings was the direct expression of God’s will. Weber saw in this idea of the calling one of the constituent elements of the modern capitalist spirit and modern culture [29. S. 356]. A rational way of life based on the idea of the calling was born from the spirit of Christian asceticism. Here, in Weber's view, an important role had been played by Western monasticism. Weber regarded the monastic ethic as the forerunner of the Protestant ethic. He saw in the monasteries the model of a rationally managed agricultural concern, and in the monk the model of an individual, not motivated economically, who lives rationally according to a systematic division of time. The work ethos of Puritanism was for Weber a secular version of the ascetic ideals of the monastic life.

Weber argues that even in the Middle Ages — and in many respects even in Antiquity — Christian asceticism was the bearer of rationalism. The first decisive breakthrough occurred with the emergence of the Western monastic way of life, as it was established in the Benedictine Order and later developed in the Cluniac and Cistercian Orders, and then, especially, the Jesuits.
Monastic existence was subjected to a systematically worked-out method for rational living with the goal of overcoming the *status naturae*, suppressing the power of irrational instincts, escaping from dependence on the world, subordinating the self to the planned dictates of will, placing one’s conduct and thought under continuous control, working in the service of the kingdom of God and thus achieving salvation [28. S. 116].

For Weber, the monk was the pioneer of a new, rational and systematic way of life. He was the first western man to live methodically according to a vocation, and organize his life and time on a principle of ever-increasing self-control [30. S. 30]. According to Weber, monastic asceticism contained the embryonic forms of that ethos which was later developed in Protestant asceticism. In this context, he quotes the assertion of Sebastian Franck that, “*Jeder Christ ein Mönch sein Leben lang*”. Of course, Weber characterized this asceticism as “other-worldly” (*ausserweltliche Askese*), while in the case of Protestantism, the asceticism was in his view “inner-worldly” [28. S. 119].

Since the doctrine of predestination denied the possibility that the individual could achieve direct communication with God by his own efforts, an idea that had been the starting-point for the “other-worldly” asceticism of the monks, the only way of salvation that remained to Protestantism was that of work in an earthly calling. The principle of rational systematic monastic asceticism had then to be carried into the world and its everyday economic and social life (6). The passionately serious inward-looking disposition, which had once given its best representatives to monasticism, was now reassigned to the pursuit of an ascetic ideal in secular life. Weber argued that the transfer of this asceticism from monastic cells to the life of the worldly calling (7) and its subsequent influence on secular morality contributed its share to the building of the huge cosmos of the modern economic system, bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production — a cosmos which exerts a vast pressure determining the life style of all individuals born into its mechanism [29. S. 357].

Monasticism which began to emerge in the West in the mid–4th century had already existed for a long time in the East; one can, therefore, regard it as in some respects an import. Nevertheless, from the beginning Western monasticism differed from its Eastern counterpart. Before Weber, the theologian and religious historian Adolf Harnack had already drawn attention to the difference. Harnack argued that the climatic conditions of the West partly dictated a rather different style of life than was possible in the East, but he attributed the decisive importance to the ideas of St. Augustine who in his doctrine of the City of God gave the Western Church a new orientation [13. S. 39] that led to a more active attitude to the world. Another key figure who gave direction to Western monasticism was Benedict of Nursia, who in 529 founded the Monastery at Monte Cassino and to whom is attributed authorship of the Rule of Saint Benedict (*Regula Benedicti*) which became the basis of the monastic life (8).

Both in imaginative and even in academic literature, monasteries have been surrounded by a whole series of myths which have not contributed to the real understanding of their function. As Réginald Grégoire has tellingly put it, the monastery cannot be regarded as an academy of science, nor as a palaeographic institute, nor as agricultural concern, sanatorium, social centre or therapeutic community [12. S. 194]. The life of
monks was and is characterized by the monotonous rhythm of everyday duties which consist of two basic elements — work and holy reading (*lectio divina*) — symbolized by the plough and pen. According to Ernst Troeltsch, monks also recognized work as a means of training the self and improving concentration; for them it was a kind of driving wheel for the increasing application of method to life [27. S. 59].

In the monasteries of the early Middle Ages the day was divided by seven daytime and one night-time religious services (9). In the Rule of St. Benedict we can read the following: “As the prophet has said, ‘Seven times each day I give thee praise’ (Psalm 118, 164). This holy seven will be fulfilled, when we perform our obligatory service to God in the morning and then at the time of the first, third, sixth, and ninth hours, vespers and completorium. Of night vigils the same prophet tells us: ‘At midnight I arise, in order to glorify thee’ (Psalm 118, 62). Then let us too give ourselves up at this time to the praise of our creator ‘for his just judgements’ (Psalm 118, 62 and 164), which is at Lauds, Prima, Tercia, Sexta, Nonæ, Vesperæ and Completorium; and in the night let us rise in order to sing his praises” [20. S. 50—51].

“Idleness is enemy to the spirit, and for this reason the brothers at certain times ought to occupy themselves with manual work, and at certain other times with holy reading” [20. S. 81]. The Rule of St. Benedict firmly establishes not just the order of religious services but also the activities in which the monks are supposed to engage during the day [20. S. 81—83]. It also states the hours at which monks are to eat [20. S. 74—75] and even how they are to behave if they should come late to mass or to the table: “At the hour of Holy Service, as soon as the signal is heard, leave everything, set down whatever is in your hand, and haste with all speed; but do so gravely to give no encouragement to light-thinking. Give nothing preference over Holy Service. If during nightly Vigils one comes in after the ‘Gloria’ of the Ninety-Fourth Psalm — for this reason we wish it to be incanted in a very protracted and slow manner — let him not take his place in the choir, but stand last of all or in the place that the abbot has specially appointed for such indolent fellows... so that being seen by all this disgrace will make them improve themselves” [20. S. 76—77]. “Whoever does not come to table before the verse so that all may speak the verse together, pray and as one sit down to the table, who then from negligence or his own fault does not come, let him be rebuked for a first and a second time: if he does not afterwards improve, let him not be allowed to attend at the common table, but eat alone excluded from the society of all, and take from him his portion of wine, until he makes amends and improves himself” [20. S. 78].

Eviatar Zerubavel is a contemporary scholar who in a publication of 1980 considered the connection between the Benedictine ethic and the modern way of scheduling. He argues that the Benedictines were clearly the first people to establish a regularity of schedule not only on the basis of the calendar, i. e. in terms of years, months and weeks, but at the level of days and hours. Zerubavel regards it as more than likely that the temporal regularity that is so characteristic for modern life had its origin in the Benedictine monasteries and the monks’ daily schedule (*horarium*) based on the division of the day into canonical hours (10). According to Zerubavel, the Benedictine *horarium* is significant as historically the first, original model for all subsequent western time schedules [31. P. 158] (11).
The monastic time schedule has also attracted the attention of the contemporary medievalist Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum who regards the theories formulated by Mumford and Zerubavel as too radical. Dohrn-van Rossum criticises the “mechanistic” picture of the monasteries which sees them as the prototype of the modern factory. In his view, assertions about “iron discipline”, or the “mechanical” or clockwork rhythm of monastic life — even if intended simply as metaphors — lead to misapprehensions. He has modified notions of monastic discipline by suggesting that the much discussed precision and punctuality of monastic behaviour in the daily schedule were not related to the kind of abstract points of time given by a clockwork machine, but were still linked to points of time in the sequence of the rhythm of collective behaviour [8. P. 42].

In his book “Asylums” Erving Goffman classifies monasteries among what he calls “total institutions” (12). The total character of these institutions is primarily symbolized by the wall or barrier which separates them from the world outside. If modern society is typically spatially divided into three areas — the area of sleep, of recreation, and of work — in which partners and authority differ in each case and there is no common design, total institutions, by contrast, are characterised by the abolition of the boundaries between these three areas. In these institutions, all aspects of life are carried on in a single place and are subject to a single authority. Those who belong to such institutions lead their daily lives in the immediate community of people who share their destiny. Individual phases of activity are exactly planned and formally governed by orders and regulations, and appointed functionaries watch over the observation of these rules. All activities, therefore, are united into a single rational plan, fulfilment of which is supposed to ensure achievement of the goal for which a given institution exists [11. S. 15—17].

Michel Foucault whose work concerned the problem of the transformation of the mechanisms of power in the course of the social modernizing process mentions monasteries in the context of the development of disciplinary technologies (13). Randall Collins, in his book “Weberian Sociological Theory” emphasizes the entrepreneurial role of monasteries and especially the influence of the Cistercian Order on the economic development of Europe [6. P. 52—54].

In the work of Hubert Treiber and Heinz Steinert we find the idea of a certain kinship between monastic and factory discipline (Wahlverwandschaft von Kloster- und Fabrikdisziplin). Both authors devote attention to the question of (a) the precise allocation of daily time, (b) the creation of regulations composed of detailed rules for individual activities, and (c) spatial (architectural) arrangements serving the aim of achievement of the appointed goal. According to Treiber and Steinert, the kinship between the monastery and the factory is not something that should be considered on the level of real historical development, but is above all a matter of the similarities of certain structures and techniques for the systematic application of discipline and method to life. At the same time, both authors suggest that the example of the monasteries may have genuinely played an inspirational role in the field of industrial production in the secularizing phase at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries [27. S. 66].

Although monasticism was, in a certain sense, in a position “marginal” to life it nevertheless made an important contribution to social development. It would certainly be in no way an exaggeration to claim that monks wrote a significant chapter in the history of the civilizing process. The monastery was clearly a model for secular life in more
ways than simply in relation to time discipline. It played an inspirational role in other respects as well.

The form of modern society has been moulded by long-term social processes, of which most have been unplanned and were not the products of design (14). On the other hand, there have also been lines of development of a rather different kind, for example in the field of human knowledge. Many generations of thinkers and reformers have devoted their efforts to experiments in identifying and trying to realize ideal forms of human co-existence in perfect, planned societies. They have formulated a whole series of the most diverse visions, ideas and projects (15) in which social utopias have loomed large. Utopian thought, which represents one of the basic features of European thought, has undoubtedly been influenced by the reality of monastic life. Reality has usually entered into utopian thought in two ways. On the one hand it is always possible to find in the background of any utopia — to a greater or lesser extent — traces of the political and social environment of its creator (whether or not consciously inserted): this reality, after all, has usually been the motivation for the formulation of a utopian vision. On the other hand, reality may also serve as an inspiration in the positive sense of the word (e.g. Plato’s vision was influenced by Sparta, and More’s was possibly influenced by the Inca Empire [17. S. 32]) (16).

The historian Ferdinand Seibt who uses the concepts of order, planning and hope (Ordnung, Planung und Hoffnung) to characterize utopian thought speaks of monasteries as places where planned thinking was cultivated for centuries, even before it became a problem of modern thought [21. S. 258]. The monastic environment supplied the creators of Utopias with a number of arguments (17) (sometimes monasteries are directly identified as the place where a utopia was realized) and also became a stimulus for attempts to implement utopias (18). The anticlerical utopias, which emerged from the 18th century, however, pushed this source of inspiration into the background and the subsequent development of utopian thought was dominated by secular visions that allowed it to be all but forgotten.

NOTES

(1) Elias’s conception of time has some relatively close affinities particularly with the conception of social time formulated by Emile Durkheim and later by Pitirim A. Sorokin [24. S. 64].
(2) In his book “Computus” Arno Borst criticises Elias’s view of the relation of the medieval church authorities to the question of time [4. S. 7]. The observation that Elias also unjustly neglected the question of monasticism is in line with this critique.
(3) We find a similar idea in Sombart’s “Industrial Art and Culture”. Sombart argues that after the disintegration of the Roman world everything from the old world that preserved a feeling for building a “finer” way of life took refuge in monastic communities as in an “ark” [23. S. 14].
(4) “The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism” was published in journal form in two parts in 1905, i.e. at a time when Simmel’s “The Philosophy of Money” (1900) and Sombart’s “Modern Capitalism” (1902) had already been published.
(5) Weber’s idea of a change from an “other-worldly” to an “inner-worldly” asceticism corresponds in an interesting way to Elias’s conception of the transformation of “external” pressures into “internal” pressures. Contrary to those authors who have a tendency to stress the difference between the concepts of Weber and Elias [3] I believe the two approaches to be to a great extent complementary, at least in relation to the subject considered here.
(6) Weber claims, for example, that sexual asceticism in Puritanism differs from the monastic only in degree, not in basic principle, and, since it includes marital life, it is much more far-reaching than the monastic version. This is because sexual intercourse even in marriage is permissible only as a divinely approved means for the glorification of god according to the command: “Increase and multiply” [29. S. 317].

(7) According to Weber, the ascetic idea of self-control is also the father of modern military discipline [28. S. 117].

(8) The qualitative shift from solitary, anchoritic life to the monastic way of life was represented by the emergence of the cenobits, founded by Pachomius (?287—347). The importance of Pachomius lies in the introduction of regular common meals, common morning and evening prayers and common household [27. S. 56—59]. The Benedictine Order was to a certain extent inspired by the older Pachomian Order and the Eastern Order of St. Basil [26. S. 78].

(9) The measurement of time in the early Middle Ages was a theme studied by Gustav Bilfinger whose work of 1892 is still regarded as exemplary today. Bilfinger shows that the division of time into twelve daytime and twelve night-time hours the length of which naturally changed in accordance with the seasonal change in the relative length of days and nights was already known in Antiquity. In addition to this division of time, the Roman Empire also used the division of day and night into quarters (known to this day as the four watches of the night); the day was divided into four sections of three hours, called tertia, sexta and nona. In his study Bilfinger describes the further development of the measurement of time, which led up to the medieval division of the day into seven canonical hours: *Matutina* (before sunrise), *Prima* (early morning), *Tertia* (later morning), *Sexta* (noon), *Nona* (afternoon), *Vespera* (sunset), *Completorium* (late evening) [1. S. 1—5]. Only with the invention of the mechanical clock, which (as Sombart had shown) began to be diffused from the 14th century, did the measurement of time using regular, uniform time periods come to be adopted.

(10) It is debatable to what extent it is justified to consider the question of daily schedule, as, for example, Zerubavel does, without considering other time dimensions, which in the case of medieval man were represented by a cyclical “natural time” in the four seasons, and a linear “time of salvation” linked to the idea of the Last Judgement [15. S. 188].

(11) Forerunners of the modern time schedule can also be found at a later period in court environments as well, which while not ascetic in nature were certainly disciplined. One of the best-known examples is the schedule of the day at the court of Louis XIV, which began with the king's *lever* at eight o'clock. It continued with morning mass and work. At one o'clock there was *diner* and afterwards a walk or hunt. At five o'clock in the evening the king and courtiers would return to the palace. In the evening, from seven to nine, there was an *appartement* — an informal entertainment. The end of the day was marked by the *grand couvert* and *coucher* [14. S. 106].

(12) Goffman speaks of five types of total institution: 1) institutions devoted to caring for those regarded as dependent and helpless (e. g. institutes for the blind, the old, orphans, the poor); 2) places for the supervision of those who cannot take care of themselves and at the same time present a certain, if in no way deliberate, risk (sanatoria for tuberculosis sufferers, lunatic asylums, leprosariums); 3) facilities designed for those considered dangerous to society (prisons, penitentiaries, prisoner-of-war camps, concentration camps); 4) institutions designed for the realization of certain goals relating to work (barracks, ships, boarding-schools, work camps); 5) institutions which serve as places of refuge from the world (monasteries, monastic communities) [11. S. 16].

(13) Foucault, who in his book “Surveiller et punir” deals with the development of the penal system and prisons, speaks of three forms of disciplinary technology: 1) practices designed to rationalize people’s (motor) movement (i. e. a certain physical but also mental drill); 2) techniques serving for continuous hierarchic control and the application of sanctions; 3) a certain architectural arrangement of space (the panopticon), which allows uninterrupted visual control [10. S. 171—292].

(14) In his work on the civilizing process Elias addresses precisely these processes.
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(15) Maurice de Gandillac, author of the book “Geneses de la modernité” [7] is one of the contemporary authors who have dealt with this problem.

(16) In 1929 Brockhausen formulated the opinion that the model for More’s ideal state was the monastic society on Mount Athos. This idea has been sharply criticised by Ernest Bloch [2. S. 61] and by others after him: today it is generally regarded as false.

(17) Let us remember, for example, Tommas Campanella, who in his treatise on the best state (De optima republice) argued in support of his vision that it was a matter of introducing customs already practiced by monks in the monastic environment [5. S. 68—73]. In Campanella we can find a tendency that is also characteristic for other Utopian writers. This is the tendency to organise society on the model of a monastery making a monastic discipline — which individual monks accept more or less voluntarily — into an obligatory rule for the whole society. In this respect, it has sometimes been pointed out that utopias have foreshadowed authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. This comment should, however, be accepted only with the qualification that utopian visions cannot be retrospectively judged simply by contemporary experience. In period literature we also, of course, find elements testifying to resistance to attempts to subject human life to a rigid rule and disciplined control. At the opposite pole of Utopian literature we find Rabelais’s vision of the Abbey of Thélème, described in the second volume of “Gargantua and Pantagruel”: “And since in the orders of this world everything is measured out, limited and arranged according to clocks, it was established that in that place there would be no clocks or any kind of timepiece, but all works would be carried out according to chance and convenience. Gargantua said, you see, that the surest waste of time he knew was to count the hours. What is the point? And the greatest folly in the world is to be governed by the ringing of the bell and not by the command of common sense and sound judgment” [19. S. 178]. In Rabelais's story the Thelemites lived their whole lives not according to laws, statutes or rules, but by their own liking and free will: “They got out of bed when they liked; they drank, ate, worked, and slept when they wanted... There was only one stipulation in their order: Do as you will” [19. S. 190].

(18) One well-known example is that of the Jesuit experiment in Paraguay (the state founded in 1610 existed up to 1768), which included a series of features of Utopian societies, especially Campanella’s sun state [17. S. 39].

REFERENCES

МОНАСТЫРИ КАК МОДЕЛЬ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ВРЕМЕНЕМ: ПОДХОД ИСТОРИЧЕСКОЙ СОЦИОЛОГИИ К АНАЛИЗУ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИОННЫХ ПРОЦЕССОВ

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В статье рассматривается роль монастырей в становлении цивилизации, особенно на заре эпохи модернизации. Особый акцент сделан на развитии процессов планирования и управления временем, в которых важнейшую роль сыграли именно монастыри, способствуя распространению рационального подхода в самых разных областях жизнедеятельности современного общества (производство, военное дело, образование, медицина и т.д.). Термопальные организации жизни в монастырях вошли в нашу жизнь не только в повседневные практики, но и стала идеальной моделью для множества утопических проектов социального реформирования.

Ключевые слова: модернизация; планирование времени; монастыри; аскетизм; рационализация; цивилизация; капитализм; утопия.