CAMEROON’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE AFRICAN UNION’S SECURITY PLAN (2000-2018)

Cover Page

Abstract


The article addresses the question of how a regional approach to dealing with current safety threats could contribute to the consolidation of security and stability in Cameroon, and Africa as a whole. The problem with states like Cameroon is that they are no longer able to fulfill some of their official functions and are consequently powerless against new security threats. Some of those threats are temporary phenomena, however, other dangers, such as poverty growth or environmental degradation, are more chronic issues. Therefore, in order to cope with the latter, efforts should be made to reinforce regional structures. The author presents a different approach to explaining the relevance of cooperation, particularly in the field of security, and looks at it from the perspective of the institutionalist theory. Relying on the anarchic conception of the world, which is similar to the realistic conception, institutionalists see the role of co-operation in reducing uncertainty and mistrust between states. As confrontation and struggle for power lead only to a situation of constant uncertainty, states have to seek an appropriate way to reduce this insecurity by establishing institutional structures, common rules and standards in order to further regulate their coexistence and interactions. However, the evolution of international relations from unilateralism to a system of stable alliances would only be possible if cooperation is more advantageous than the unilateral approach. In other words, Cameroon's decision to integrate community structures and adhere to a number of principles and rules is, in the first place, in its national interests.

The African Union (AU) is an African state organization established on July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa, in accordance with the Sirte Declaration of September 9, 1999. Two years after its constituent treaty was signed, the African Union replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU)1. A year later, in July 2003, at the Maputo summit in Mozambique, several institutions, including the African Union Commission, the PanAfrican Parliament and the Peace and Security Council, were founded. One of the objectives of the African Union is to “promote peace, security and stability in the continent”2. One of the AU principles is “peaceful resolution of conflicts among the member states of the Union through appropriate means decided by the Assembly”3. It is therefore natural that providing both internal and international peace is among the AU’s major priorities, although, for a long time, initiatives in this direction between Cameroon and the African Union have been conducted in discretion. 1 Charter of the Organization of African Unity. 2 Article 3 (f) of the Constitution. 3 Article 4 (e) of the Constitution. THE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS OF CAMEROON IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN AFRICA The principal line of Cameroon’s diplomatic activities in Africa is to develop regional alliances. The commitment to African cooperation, particularly through regional and subregional multilateral organizations, remains one of the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. For President Amadou Ahidjo and his successor Paul Biya, strengthening ties between African peoples and states is the first and foremost goal on the way toward the continent’s development. Indeed, the first Cameroonian president was an ardent proponent of the idea that the consolidation of African states, is a sine qua non for the political, economic and socio-cultural emancipation of African peoples [3. P. 48]. To implement this objective, Cameroon has become involved in the African Union’s security projects based on the assumption that pooling efforts between African countries through the process of institutionalization of security allows the formation of strong regional blocs. Intergovernmentalism (the IGO), as defined by its proponents, is “a rational process designed to optimize the means pooled by member states” through a concerted action, which serves as “a multiplier of power” [18. P. 170]. In many ways, the IGO helps to revitalize regional cooperation through the process of building “spaces of meaning”. This notion used by Laidi Zaki reflects the existence of regional solidarity built around a collective identity. The “spaces of meaning” in the construction of intergovernmental organizations are reminiscent of regional structures which wish to be seen as being based on a collective ideal and attempt to find common meanings [21. P. 9-10]. Cameroon is at the crossroads of major socio-economic and security challenges. Faced with the urgency of the terrorist threat that thrives on the social unsteadiness of Cameroon and its neighbors, the African Union (AU) has adopted a wide range of legal and organizational instruments to curb its expansion on the continent. Besides its strategic location on the African continent, its diversity and its natural, human and cultural complexity, Cameroon offers a most enviable geographical and climatic panorama, capable of making it a priority tourist destination in Africa. Cameroon is distinguished by political stability, its local economic environment offering advantages for trade, market flexibility, a large domestic market (more than 19 million potential consumers), abundant natural resources and an important seafront. Paul Biya made “the peace, security, stability of Cameroon, rigor and moralization, its major axes of governance”. In 2014, Biya received the Pan-African Union of Lawyers prize for the “peaceful resolution of conflicts,” [8] presented to him by the former President of the Republic of Africa of the South, Thabo Mbeki. Cameroon, “because of its demographic weight and its diversified economy, appears to be the main economic power in the subregion” and therefore offers undeniable economic advantages, as well as an entry point to Central Africa [11. P. 308]. The south-western part of Cameroon is situated in the Gulf of Guinea and, despite its multiple advantages, the country is currently in the throes of growing crime. The riparian states are trying to secure their coasts in a concerted effort. A symbiosis between African states is a necessity, because a single state’s fight against crime is far less effective than a collective action which involves amalgamating technical, human and operational resources [11. P. 308]. In 1993, the United Nations called on to African regional and subregional organizations for a longterm co-operation allowing the countries to adapt to various changes in the world at their own pace, namely to settle their disputes peacefully, using their own mechanisms. To refer to the African states’ ability to cope with multiple aspects of the current crises on their own terms, we suggest using the word “Africanization” [2]. In the face of security challenges, African states must rely on their combined effort, because “regional cooperation is essential,” said Antonio Maria Costa, Director General of the United Nations Office in Vienna [11. P. 309]. Thus, Cameroon’s participation in AU-initiated Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) is primarily aimed at its own security in view of its geographical proximity to numerous hotbeds of tension, particularly in the sub-region of Central Africa. The civil wars in the area give rise to security concerns well beyond the hostility zones, because regional conflicts have a tendency to expand to national level. Cameroon’s participation in PKOs also has strategic objectives: to demonstrate the technical expertise and competence of its army, which is expected to contribute to the strengthening of Cameroon’s influence in Africa. In 2016, the US Armament site, Global Fire Power, ranked the Armed Forces of Cameroon (FAC) the 106th out of 126 armies in the world, and the 20th on the African continent4. CAMEROON’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA Cameroon is heavily involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa under the auspices of the AU5. Various Cameroonian contingents are made up of soldiers, police officers, military observers and other troops. The Defense Forces of Cameroon (DFC)’s participation in military peacekeeping operations (MPOs) can be individual or joint, depending on strategic, operational and tactical levels of such operations. Individual participation in PKOs engages a minimum number of troops, most of whom are contractees (soldiers or policemen) working either at an operational or strategic level. Collective participation involves contingents who join larger groups in an operation. On the whole, the DFC’s peacekeeping involvement in Africa is mostly individual, as was the case in Darfur (Sudan), Angola, DRC, Rwanda, RCA, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali [1]. In December 2010, the AU Defense and Security Committee chose Cameroon to headquarter the African Union Continental Logistics Base (CLB). This decision was endorsed at the Conference of Heads of State in January 2011. The CLB was supposed to start operating in 2014. The headquarters agreement for the CLB was signed on October 12, 2015 in Yaoundé, and was followed by a number of technical meetings aimed at advancing the date of its startup. The first meeting took place in November 2015, the second and the third were held in January and June 2016. At the third meeting, which was held in Addis Ababa, Cameroon agreed with the AU on the parties’ terms of refer- 4 Global Firepower, 2016, World Military Strength Rankings. 5 See: Ministry of Defense, Cameroon. ence. Cameroon leaders are planning another meeting in order to expedite strategic cooperation with American partners who show enthusiasm about the project and are willing to help carry it out. In these cases, many non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and DFC officers were dispatched at the request of the AU as observers. They often find themselves at the operational and even strategic level, either because of their individual skills or through seats reserved for Cameroon. In 1995, a contingent of 20 Cameroonian soldiers intervened in South Kivu (DRC) at the request of the High Commission of Refugees. Thereafter, groups of 3 and 5 officers also intervened in Rwanda and the DRC as observers in 1995. Furthermore, on the 8th of February 1999 the Cameroonian government provided staff for the training of civilian police, which are at the disposal of the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (UNMCAR). At the expiration of the mandate of the UNMCAR in February 2000, a Cameroonian senior officer was in charge of civilian police training, a function that was maintained within the framework of the UN Office for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). In July 2009, another member of the CDF held the position of Senior Logistics Officer within the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Cameroonian Defense Forces responded in contingents of four officers on behalf of the AU in South Sudan within the framework of “Darfur DESK”. As of 2005, contingents of 10, then of 20 observers succeeded one other. Since the transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AUMS) to the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNMD), the CDF has sent groups of five officers in relays. In Ethiopia, a Cameroonian officer was part of the staff of the African Standby Force (ASF). In Côte d'Ivoire, since 2003, another Cameroonian officer is a member of the staff of the United Nations mission in Ivory Coast (UNMIC), serving as a military representative of the President of the AU Commission. One can recall that Cameroonian police officers were members of the humanitarian mission in Goma (current Zaire, DRC) between 1994 and 1998-2000, and later in the framework of the (UNMC), in the DRC in 2006. The case of CAR is even more remarkable. Since 2008, Cameroon has been present in CAR alongside other ECCAS countries for the mission of peacebuilding in the country. It is a contingent of 107 in addition to the 4 staff officers, 12 support staff and the Chief of Staff. Since June 2013, Cameroon has also sent 517 soldiers and 320 policemen (totaling 837 individuals) to participate in the International Support Mission in Central African Republic (ISMCA), under the authority of the African Union Peace and Security Council (UAPPS) [1]. Since 2015, Cameroon has also been home to the Continental Logistics Base (CLB), where the logistics system is kept, to be assigned to peace missions initiated and conducted under the umbrella of African institutions6. Participation in peacekeeping 6 Addis Ababa, October 13, 2015: African Union (AU) Peace and Security Commissioner Ambassador Smail Chergui and Cameroonian Minister of State for Defense Joseph Beti Assomo, signed the Agreement on the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) of the African Standby Force (ASF), to be established in Douala on 12 October 2015, in Yaoundé. The signing ceremony took place at the Ministry of Defense, in the presence of members of the Government of Cameroon and international partners. operations can also augment traditionally resource-constrained defense budgets [12]. Thus, by acting in concert with its regional partners for the development of intergovernmental organizations in Central Africa, Cameroon also serves its national interests. According to Hirschmann's hypothesis: “Any State that joins a regional organization does so both to increase the benefits that this membership affords and to influence the partners in cooperation” [6. P. 360]. FIGHTING SECURITY THREATS Laws introduced by the African Union are applicable in Cameroon because the country is a member state, and has ratified these laws. The primary legal source is the Constituent Act of the African Union; all other laws proceed from this act [10]. Cameroon is a Member State of the United Nations and a founding member of the Organization of African Unity, which was later transformed into the African Union. It endorsed the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Human Rights (civil and political), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights [9]. The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) at the dawn of the new millennium heralded a turning point in the integration process on the continent. It was not merely a change of name but a substantial structural transformation, the purpose of which was to meet two major challenges: enabling Africa to take advantage of globalization and respond to various crises the continent is facing [14]. Confronted with major socio-economic and security challenges, such as the emerging terrorist threat that thrives on the social instability prevalent on the continent, the African Union (AU) has adopted a wide range of legal and organizational instruments to restrict the expansion of terrorism on its territory. The unprecedented rise of jihadism in Africa, which is taking a huge toll on the continents’ security, is rooted in the weakness of the mechanisms developed by the AU to counter the terrorist threat at the regional and continental levels. Notwithstanding some progress achieved in the security field, there are still numerous faults in the system, which relegate the pan-African institution to a weak link in international cooperation against terrorism. The cross-border nature of the threat requires that the problem be addressed at the continental level; however, it must be done in a coherent and coordinated effort by way of developing an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Also, resolving the many malfunctions in the AU governance is essential in order to get Africa out of the vicious circle of insecurity. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Africa: it has gradually taken root on the continent since the early 1990s7. Cameroon's reluctance to assume full responsibility for the increasingly complex and devastating terrorist threat underscores the urgency of the AU peace goals. The African Union seems to have taken the measure of the challenge: it adopted numerous legal documents and established various bodies assigned to counter-terrorism (most of which are mentioned in the Constitutive Act). 7 The first wave of the Islamic movement took place in 1992 within the AIG (Armed Islamic Group) after the Algerian government canceled the elections marked by the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front. Peace and security issues were frequently the highlight of debates, particularly at the first ordinary Summit in Maputo in July 2003. As for making up for previous failures, African Heads of State and Government have adopted a new audacious defense policy, the implementation of which - provided a common effort is taken - will benefit the whole continent. Pending the establishment of the Peace and Security Council8, the central body and, with it, the 1993 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, serve as an organizational framework. One year after the 35th OAU summit in July 1999, the states adopted the Algiers Convention - the first continentwide agreement on the prevention and combatting of terrorism, translated into the three official languages9. In September 2002, a high-level intergovernmental meeting of the AU member states took place in Algiers, during which the countries approved a Plan of Action to implement their commitments and obligations. The plan included specific provisions on police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, suppression of terrorist financing, exchange of information and coordination, etc. Thus, the African states’ anti-terrorist efforts took a quantum leap, reinforced by the Additional Protocol to the Algiers Convention (July 2004), which aimed precisely at “strengthening the effective implementation of the Convention”10. Article 3 (d) of the Protocol endorses the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, whose primary objective is to “coordinate and harmonize efforts in the prevention and the fight against international terrorism in all its aspects”. Other resolutions - (256) 2009 and (136) 2014 - combine provisions on prevention of terrorism financing, national capacity-building and promotion of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Three important dates add to the chronology of AU anti-terrorist commitments: the 2009 AU decision on criminalization of paying ransoms to terrorist groups for the release of hostages; the appointment of the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation (October 2010); and the adoption of the Model Law on Counter-Terrorism to assist the member states in strengthening and updating their national anti-terrorism legislation (July 2011). In his speech, President Paul Biya declared that “Cameroon also welcomes the decision taken at the end of January 2015 by the African Union. As you know, the Peace and Security Council, meeting at the level of the Heads of State and Government, authorized the deployment of a combined Multinational Force of 7,500. It also decided to convene a meeting of experts in Yaoundé to clarify the operational concept. The meeting was held on February 5-7, 2015. It gave rise to a thorough analysis of the situation and to the elaboration of the mandate of the Joint Multinational Force. The decision of the African Union also paves the way for a referral of the Security 8 On September 16, 2003, only 16 of the 53 African Union member states ratified the Protocol on the establishment of the African Union. See document CAB / CEG / 23.22 of the African Union. 9 It is important to recall the Resolution on Strengthening Cooperation and Coordination among States [AHG / Res.213 (XXVIII)] adopted by the OAU in 1992 with the purpose of combatting the phenomena of extremism and terrorism. 10 Resolution on the Struggle of African Countries against Terrorism in all its Forms through the Strengthening of National Capacities and the Promotion of International Cooperation in this Field. Rabat, November 2, 2014. Council with a view to the adoption of a resolution”11. According to Nkosazana DlaminiZuma, “Boko Haram ... is a threat to our collective security and development which requires a collective, effective and decisive response” [19]. However, the various resolutions adopted by the AU hardly meet any concrete actions, as Idriss Deby openly acknowledged: “We often meet, we talk too much, we write a lot, but we do not act enough and sometimes not at all”12. Indeed, the lack of real action by the leadership of the African Union is proven true by two worrisome facts: first, only 41 of the 53 member states ratified the Algiers Convention, yet the document took effect on November 6, 2002; second, although only 15 states endorsed the Additional Protocol, it became enforced on 26 February 2014, ten years after its adoption. However, the adopted documents strengthen coherence and coordination between the states by clearly defining the respective roles of the Commission and the Council in counter-terrorism activities. They also oblige member states to submit reports to the Peace and Security Council at regular intervals on the measures they have taken to prevent and combat terrorism and on all terrorist attacks that took place on their territories. It goes without saying that such reports greatly facilitate information sharing, coordination and monitoring of decisions adopted at the continental level. The fight against Boko Haram represents one of the multiple focal points of the AU’s combat against terrorism. As part of its anti-terrorist efforts, the AU initiated the establishment of the Mixed Multinational Force (MMF), which brings together civilian and military units from four member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), plus Benin. The regional initiative began to take shape in June 2014, when the AU expressed its willingness to set up a regional force similar to the one created against the Lord’s resistance Army (LRA) to end the atrocities of Boko Haram in Lake Chad. Subsequently, the African Union chose to rely on the project initiated by the LCBC. For the president of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, fighting Boko Haram “is not just a threat to some countries, it is a threat to the entire continent. It is a global threat that must be tackled globally, with Africa in the lead” [19]. On March 6, 2015, after prolonged negotiations between Heads of State and experts, the AU endorsed the creation of the Mixed Multinational Force. The mandate of the MMF was determined and its Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was validated. On October 20, 2015, the AU and the LCBC split their responsibilities in the Memorandum of Understanding, which specifies the role of the AU Commission and the LCBC Secretariat in the implementation of CONOPS. The importance for the states to combine efforts in their fight against Boko Haram was recognized in the course of negotiations between the LCBC countries. Historical tensions between Cameroon and Nigeria and struggle for leadership between Chad and Nigeria have been impeding cooperation of intelligence and security services in the region. It should be specified that setting borders between Cameroon and Nigeria was 11 Speech by HE Mr. Paul Biya, President of the Republic of Cameroon at the opening of the Extraordinary Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa (COPAX), Yaoundé, February 16, 2015. 12 Speech by President Idriss Deby at the opening of the 26th AU Summit on 30 January 2016. a matter of an extended legal dispute covering the period between the Berlin Congress (1885) and the end of colonization (1960). To present day, the two countries have not entirely settled the dispute: violating the OAU charter and showing contempt for colonial agreements, the Nigerian army illegally occupies Cameroonian territory along the border [20]. Collaboration between the LCBC and the AU on peace and security issues has arguably been most dynamic in the area of peace operations [7]. However, Boko Haram took advantage of the disagreement between the two sides and expanded its range of action [16]. Only the urgency of the threat forced the states to overcome their antagonisms. President of the Republic, Paul Biya, insists on the global nature of the terrorist threat which, from his point of view, should therefore be the subject of a global response at the international level and particularly at the level of the African Union [15. P. 21]. There is a need to develop multi-sectoral approaches (security, governance, development) and multidimensional methods (prevention, protection, prosecution, response), associated with multi-actor diplomacy in order to come up with an adequate response to the insurgent aggression. The approach must be holistic, and all dimensions of the fight against terrorism must be tackled. Besides the spike in terrorist activities, another major problem facing Africa these days is HIV / AIDS pandemics. The current HIV / AIDS situation in Cameroon remains a concern, despite numerous preventive measures undertaken by the government, international partners and civil society. Over the past several years, the number of educational and awareness-raising activities aimed at informing the public about ways of preventing the disease and treating HIV-positive people has increased. Although calculating HIV spread rates proved to be a methodological challenge, Minister of Public Health of Cameroon André Mama Fouda reviewed available findings in the progress of the disease on the territory of the country. According to the review, in 2011, almost 60% of Cameroon's 570,000 HIV-positive people were female. In addition, 70% of newly infected victims were in the age range of 15-24. The most affected areas of the country proved to be the north-west and the east with respective prevalence rates of 8.7% and 8.3% (the national average is 5.1%). The least affected regions were the far north (with 1.7%) and the north (with 2%). The effects of HIV and AIDS pose a significant threat to Africa’s GDP growth and, consequently, to the continent’s exports and imports. At the 19th Summit of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 201213, African Heads of State and Government adopted a road map for dealing with the HIV/ AIDS outbreaks. The plan, developed by the African Union Commission and the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency with the support of UNAIDS, has set a new course for the continent's responses to the most serious pandemics. “This Roadmap is a major step forward for our responses to AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria”, said Thomas Yayi Boni, President of the African Union and former President of Benin. According to Boni, “it [the Roadmap] will enable us [the AU] to implement solutions initiated by Africa reflecting the dynamism and the potential of our continent, by producing pharmaceuticals locally, for example”. “Together, we will invest in the future”, said the AU President. Organized around three strategic lines, namely health governance, diversified financing and access to medicines, the Roadmap proposes a number of actual solutions to provide sustainable responses to AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. It sets out the objectives, expected results, roles and responsibilities for the period of three years (by 2015). “This Roadmap an engine for solutions of African origin”, said Ibrahim Mayaki, Executive Secretary of the NEPAD Agency. “Together we must support African leaders to implement it [the Roadmap]. This implies new partnerships, new funding mechanisms and new approaches to strengthen sustainable African institutions”, stated Mayaki. As Michel Sidibé, Executive Director of UNAIDS, noted, “The vision of shared responsibility and global solidarity of the AIDS Observatory in Africa is radically different from traditional approaches”. He also called on all African leaders to implement the Roadmap without delay and appealed to all development partners to stand behind them “in a spirit of solidarity and mutual accountability”. Following the outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in 201414, the AU convened its 24th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in 2015. Cameroon proposed a budgeted operational plan that was presented to all sectors and financial partners. This plan was in line with the WHO’s recently prepared checklist. The goal was achieved with the support of the United Nations Emergency Response Mission to Ebola (UNERME)15, based in Ghana. UNERME provides assistance to the affected countries and initiates preventative measures in non-affected countries, such as Cameroon. CONCLUSION Cameroonian diplomacy of military intervention in Africa depends on which countries are involved in the conflict: the African Union (AU) member countries, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) states, or its immediate neighbors in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the security field, various actions have been carried out and significant results have been achieved. Under the aegis of the African Union, the African states united their counter-terrorism efforts and increased security cooperation networks. However, the effectiveness of all these initiatives is diminished by the lack of a strategic framework setting guidelines for actions and resolving the internal conflicts within the panAfrican institution. 14 Since the outbreak of the epidemic in March 2014 in Guinea, the World Health Organization (WHO), represented by its Director General, has registered 2,489 deaths out of a total of 4,985 people infected. “It’s not just an epidemic. This is not just a public health crisis. It is a social, humanitarian, economic crisis and a threat to national security that goes far beyond the affected areas”, said Margaret Chan, Director-General of WHO. United Nations, New York, 2014. 15 In the face of one of the worst epidemics the world has known, the UN Secretary-General proposed creation of a United Nations Emergency Response Mission to Ebola (UNERME). United Nations, New York, NY, 2014. As for Cameroon, it is rarely on the side of its fellow AU member states, when important decisions affecting the whole continent are being made. Paul Biya was expected at the 14th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, however, he did not show [17]. Nevertheless, Cameroonian President’s and other leaders’ devotion to the fight against terrorism is visible, and their desire to achieve the ideal of “pacified and secure Africa”, expressed in the African Union Agenda 2063, is evident. African Heads of State have realized the urgency of strengthening security on the continent and adopted new principles of the rule of law and maintenance of peace. Naturally, history does not evolve in a straight line: coups, civil wars, regional conflicts will not disappear at the drop of a hat. However, the goal is clear: to find African solutions to African problems (Zorgbibe, 2013); although the African Union’s dependence on its financial partners considerably reduces its readiness to act, giving little room for maneuver. Once the AU’s challenging financial situation is resolved, reducing its dependence on partners and donors, it will get some leeway in managing its own security crises [4]. Finally, for decades, powers outside the African continent (the United States, the USSR, France, Great Britain, and Portugal) played the role of “African sovereigns” and imposed their solutions (diplomatic or military) on Africans. Caught up in the Cold War, global nations depended on the evolution of relations between the two superpowers: the US and the USSR [13]. However, over the past decade, the African Union has been working to build peace on the continent independently. The Peace and Security Council, the Commission, the Council of Elders, the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force are all results of its work [5]. While Cameroon’s fight against the Islamist group Boko Haram is dragging on, all major decisions are being made by the UN forces. The African Union still experiences difficulties in conducting peacekeeping operations on its own due to the lack of financing and both basic and logistical resources. To become ‘its own boss’, the AU needs to step up its responsibility and work unanimously towards establishing security in African countries.

Jean Cottin Kouma

Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)

Email: cottingelin@yahoo.fr
Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6, Moscow, Russian Federation, 117198 PhD Student of the Department of Comparative Politics, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia

  • A Remarkable Cameroonian Participation in the Maintenance of Peace in the World. Daily Le Jour. 17.01.2015 (In Fr.).
  • Abdoulaye B. Africanization of Conflict Resolution: Myth or Reality? The Case of African Mediations in Francophone West Africa (2000-2010). International Perspectives. 2013; 3: 70-88.
  • Ahidjo A. The Time of Control of the National Development. Dakar: New African Editions; 1981.
  • Assanvo W. Terrorist Threat in West Africa: State of National, Regional and International Responses. OVIDA. September 2012.
  • Balde H. The African Union Must Give Preference to the Prevention of Armed Conflicts. Institute for Research and Education on Peace. NAP; 2013; 4-5.
  • Battistella D. Theories of International Relations. Paris: Press Po Science, 2nd edition; 2006. 588 p. (In Fr.).
  • Boutellis A., Williams P-D. Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships. The International Peace Institute. April; 2003: 1-21.
  • Cameroon: Paul Biya Laureate of the UPA Prize for the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts. Cameroon Tribune. 09.06.2014.

Views

Abstract - 126

PDF (English) - 73

PlumX


Copyright (c) 2019 Kouma J.C.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.