

## НАУЧНЫЕ ШКОЛЫ

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### R2P: Concept, Aspirational Norm or Principle?

Interview with Professor Alex J. Bellamy,  
University of Queensland (Australia)



**Abstract.** Professor Alex J. Bellamy is Director Asia Pacific Centre for R2P, Professor of Peace & Conflict Studies, University of Queensland, Non-Resident Senior Advisor, International Peace Institute (New York). He is the author of *Kosovo and International Society* [Bellamy 2002], *Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?* [Bellamy 2004], *Understanding Peacekeeping* [Bellamy, Williams, Griffin 2004], *International Society and Its Critics* [Bellamy 2005], *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq* [Bellamy 2006], *Fighting Terror: Ethical Dilemmas* [Bellamy 2008], *Responsibility to Protect: the Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities* [Bellamy 2009], *Responsibility to Protect: A Defence* [Bellamy 2014], *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* [Bellamy, Williams 2013] and *Massacres and Morality* [Bellamy 2012].

Alex J. Bellamy is one of the editorial board of Ethics & International Affairs, co-editor of The Global Responsibility to Protect Journal.

In his interview, Prof. Bellamy talks about institutionalization of R2P concept that would be able to help in prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Prof. Bellamy identifies three categories of situations where it's proving very difficult to protect civilians.

**Key words:** Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the United Nations, peacekeeping, Asia Pacific region, Middle East, Syrian conflict, genocide of Rohingya people in Myanmar

— **As Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect how do you personally appreciate and evaluate the development of the concept since 2005?**

— The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)<sup>1</sup> was agreed by Heads of State and Government at the 2005 UN World Summit<sup>2</sup>. It was a response to the acknowledged failure of the international community to protect people from genocide and other mass atrocities

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<sup>1</sup> Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty “The Responsibility to Protect”. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001. More detailed information about R2P, see: [Evans 2008].

<sup>2</sup> Responsibility to Protect. URL: <http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

in Rwanda and Bosnia. Genocide and other atrocities truly shock the conscience of humankind and world leaders came together to commit themselves to doing better to prevent these crimes and protect vulnerable populations from them. More than a decade on, efforts to implement the principle have yielded mixed results. Things have progressed most on the normative and political fronts. Thanks in large part to the annual sequence of UN Secretary-General's Reports<sup>3</sup> and General Assembly dialogues since 2009<sup>4</sup>, political consensus on the meaning and scope of the principal, and commitment to it, have widened and deepened. Only a few states now object to the principle itself. In my region, for example, only North Korea<sup>5</sup> rejects R2P as a principle. So we have seen the steady institutionalization of R2P through the engagement of the General Assembly, Security Council, and Human Rights Council, the proliferation of international networks such as the Global Focal Points Network<sup>6</sup> which now comprises some 60 state members, and the engagement of regional organizations. But we have done much less well where it matters most — the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (I collectively label these 'atrocities crimes'). There have been notable successes — in Kenya (where Kofi Annan helped mediate an end to post-election violence, framing his work in R2P terms), Guinea (Conakry) (where ECOWAS, the AU, and UN worked together to prevent the escalation of violence after the government opened fire on protestors), and Cote d'Ivoire<sup>7</sup>, decisive international action helped prevent atrocities. In other cases, we have achieved a mixed record — undoubtedly protecting some people, but leaving others exposed to atrocity crimes, as in South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Mali. And then there have been abject failures, where the international community has either stood aside in the face of atrocity crimes or — worse — has contributed to them. Sri Lanka, Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar fall into this category. The challenge we have before us today, then, is that of converting agreement on the principle of R2P into really existing protection for vulnerable populations. No one has the monopoly of wisdom on this, but we need to openly and honestly evaluate past performance and endeavor in good faith to do better. "We the peoples" of the UN demand nothing less.

<sup>3</sup> Secretary-General's Reports. URL: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>4</sup> General Assembly Interactive Thematic Dialogues. URL: <http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/dialogues.shtml> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>5</sup> In 2014 the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly passed a resolution concerning R2P and called on the UN Security Council to analyze the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court to adopt sanctions.

<sup>6</sup> The R2P Focal Points initiative was launched in September 2010 by the governments of Denmark and Ghana together with the Global Centre for the R2P at the annual Ministerial Meeting on the R2P held during the opening of the UN General Assembly. Appointment of an R2P Focal Point demonstrates governments' commitment to mass atrocity prevention, regardless of their capacity. URL: [http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p\\_focalpoints\\_factsheet.pdf](http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p_focalpoints_factsheet.pdf) (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>7</sup> As for Cote d'Ivoire, resolution 1975 (30 March 2011) was adopted unanimously. It "reaffirmed the primary responsibility of each state to protect civilians and authorised a strengthening of the UN mission there (UNOCI) to include the use of 'all necessary means' to protect civilians. None of the Council's members referred to RtoP in their statements on the resolution, suggesting that its inclusion had not been controversial (S/PV. 6508, 30 March 2011)". See: [Bellamy 2015].

— **There are some obvious changes in the international studies research field and attitude to the R2P concept. What has changed in the study of R2P? What centers, publications on R2P issues occupy the leading positions today?**

— One of the effects of R2P has been to massively increase the study of atrocity prevention [Luck 2018]. In fact, before 2005 there was no distinct field known as atrocity prevention, so the whole endeavor is quite recent. As a result, emphasis has shifted away from debates about humanitarian intervention but still the academic field remains too preoccupied with a small number of cases (mainly Libya [Reike 2012] and Syria<sup>8</sup>) and does not see the wider picture. Academics tend also to remain focused more on military intervention [Ramsey 2002; Tesón 2001] than on preventive action which is why we still don't have good answers to key questions about what works when it comes to prevention. That is starting to change but I'd like it to change more, so that we write less about R2P itself and more about the practical challenges of prevention and protection. There are now a number of centers doing research on R2P, including dedicated centers such as my own which is focused on the Asia Pacific Centre<sup>9</sup>, the European Centre for R2P based at Leeds University<sup>10</sup> in the UK, and the Genocide Institute<sup>11</sup> based in Montreal. There are also a number of wider research centers working on R2P issues, including the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre<sup>12</sup> in Ghana. R2P even has its own journal, called *Global R2P*<sup>13</sup>, which looks to publish the best new research on the subject. Its editorial board comes from every continent and includes scholars from Russia and China<sup>14</sup>.

— **What set of criteria would you prefer to use for evaluation of R2P? Have they basically changed?**

— R2P is an aspirational norm. That means two things. First, it is a recognition that we aspire to a world in which atrocities will be prevented and populations protected and a framework setting out whose responsibility that is, starting with the primary responsibility of the state itself. Second, R2P exists precisely because we have so often failed to achieve its aspiration — because atrocity crimes do persist and because our responses to them have often proven inadequate. So in this sense, R2P is not something

<sup>8</sup> See: Goldberg M.L. (2012). How Libya's Success Became Syria's Failure. UN Dispatch, 19 January. URL: <https://www.undispatch.com/how-libyas-success-became-syrias-failure/> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>9</sup> Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. URL: <https://r2pasiapacific.org/> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>10</sup> European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. URL: <https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>11</sup> Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. URL: <http://www.concordia.ca/research/migs.html> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>12</sup> Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. URL: <https://www.kaiptc.org/> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>13</sup> Global Responsibility to Protect Journal. URL: <https://brill.com/view/journals/gr2p/gr2p-overview.xml> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>14</sup> Ekaterina Stepanova, National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Russia) and Liu Tiewa, Beijing Foreign Studies University (China) are among them.

that we evaluate, it is a principle we use to evaluate the performance of states and international organizations. When we look at that, we have to be realistic and recognize that situations where atrocities occur or are likely to occur are not easy to resolve. Even with the best of will and plenty of resources, atrocity prevention is difficult and may not succeed. So I think it is best to think of a ‘responsibility to try’ — an expectation that actors will do whatever they reasonably can to support prevention and protection and, especially, that when crises emerge the protection of populations from atrocity crimes will be prioritized over all else. Of course, that means that each evaluation needs to be sensitive to the nature and context of each case.

**— What are the main challenges in protecting the civilians in the current conflicts?**

— When we look around the world today, we see three sets of situations where it is proving very difficult to protect civilians.

The first are mainly in the Middle East — Syria, Yemen, and Libya, and the still lingering threats posed by ISIS and its affiliates, but the crisis in Myanmar fits into this category as well. I think Lakhdar Brahimi summed up<sup>15</sup> the principal problem for each of these when he resigned as special envoy for Syria complaining that not one government that he had worked with had prioritized the protection of populations from atrocity crimes. Instead, they had prioritized their own geopolitical interests or security concerns. This, I think, applies to all these cases — though in different ways, but I think it is fair to say that in none of these cases did the permanent members of the Security Council, or — for that matter — most of the regional actors — prioritize civilian protection. As a result, we have seen political divisions inhibit civilian protection and sometimes we have seen external powers fan the flames of violence. This is a political reality, of course, but we have to work harder to increase the prioritization of civilian protection.

The second category of cases faces an altogether different set of problems. In these situations, the international community has come together to take action to protect civilians by establishing peacekeeping missions with protection mandates. These undoubtedly save lives, but they confront serious challenges in terms of resources, concepts and doctrines, and working towards an exit strategy. Here I am thinking about UN missions in CAR (*United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic*), Mali (*United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali*), South Sudan (*United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan*), and the DRC (*United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*) and the AU mission in Somalia (*The African Union Mission in Somalia*). Serious thought and attention needs to be paid to how we might strengthen these operations.

The third category relates to the rise of violent extremists and non-state armed groups. The number of atrocity crimes committed by these groups has increased

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<sup>15</sup> United Nations. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (another title “Brahimi Report”), August 21, 2000 (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809). URL: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55305.pdf> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

significantly. Think, for example, of the ISIS genocide against the Yazidis in Iraq, the Islamist insurgency in Mali, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Whilst concepts of stabilization have been developed to support states in meeting these threats, we still lack good concepts and tools to guide how best to prevent atrocities by these actors and protect vulnerable populations. Thought also needs to be given to the relationship between R2P, counter-terrorism, and the new countering violent extremism agenda.

**— The UN input is still regarded to be the most valuable in dealing with the problems of human insecurity. What is the UN interpretation of the R2P? How do you estimate the last General Assembly debates on the R2P? What is it doing to support the norm realization in practice? Do all members support the concept or it is still the point for a sharp discussion between different coalitions and communities? What is the position of the BRICS countries?**

— The UN Secretary-General has outlined a three-pillar approach<sup>16</sup> to implementing R2P. The first relates to the state's primary responsibility to protect its own population, the second relates to the international community's responsibility to assist states to protect their own population, and the third relates to the protection of populations by the international community, including collective action through the UN. Through the nine General Assembly dialogues on R2P<sup>17</sup>, we have seen states increasingly express good understanding of this approach and their endorsement of it. Today, barely any states demur. Fewer still oppose the concept itself. The challenges today are not conceptual or moral; they are practical and political and relate to policies in relation to specific crises. In some cases, states sharply disagree, but in other cases they find consensus. A recent example of that was the Council's decision to impose an arms embargo on South Sudan.

In my view, the General Assembly debates and more recent formal dialogues play a vital role for four reasons. First, they facilitate inclusive, open, and transparent debate on R2P. Personally, I've always found critical statements by states most helpful as these

<sup>16</sup> 2005 World Summit Outcome. URL: [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_RES\\_60\\_1.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf) (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>17</sup> Formal Debate on the Secretary-General's report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* (A/63/677), 2009; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect* (A/64/864), 2010; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* (A/65/877-S/2011/393), 2011; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *Timely and Decisive Response* (A/66/874-S/2012/578), 2012; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *State Responsibility and Prevention* (A/67/929-S/2013/399), 2013; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *Fulfilling our collective responsibility: International assistance and the Responsibility to Protect* (A/68/947-S/2014/449), 2014; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* (A/69/981—S/2015/500), 2015; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *Mobilising collective action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect* (A/70/999-S/2016/620), 2016; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Secretary-General's report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention* (A/71/1016-S/2017/556), 2017.

help to identify areas where we need to do more work, more thinking, and more talking in order to find the common ground needed to make R2P more of a lived reality. Second, they allow states to share information about their experience with R2P and related agendas. Countries like Tanzania and Ghana have talked about the role of their national peace councils, Thailand has emphasized its gender training for peacekeeping, and China has emphasized the importance of development to atrocity prevention. This helps us develop a more comprehensive understanding of the range of activities that go into supporting atrocity prevention and to identify where more support is needed. Third, the General Assembly is the most democratic and inclusive of UN bodies, so its engagement helps promote accountability. After Libya, states demanded greater accountability. I agree with that. The General Assembly debates provides an excellent opportunity for states to hold the UN's other organs (like the Security Council, Human Rights Council and Secretariat) as well as individual states or groups of states accountable for what they have — or have not — done to support the implementation of R2P. Fourth, the General Assembly is the primary decision-making body of the UN, so it stands to reason that it is this body that should identify the future course and priorities for R2P going forward. I would like to see R2P become a standing agenda item and real efforts to promote dialogue towards resolutions so that the Assembly can set the course for the UN.

In terms of the BRICS — as I mentioned above national positions vary from state to state<sup>18</sup>. All of the BRICS have endorsed R2P but all have from time to time raised concerns. In terms of their voting pattern, on contentious issues they have generally not voted the same way either in the Council or the Assembly. Each has its own red lines and issues of concern, which also vary from case to case, but each also brings something important to supporting R2P. Brazil's leadership on 'responsibility while protecting' was very welcome, India and China make immense contributions to peacekeeping, as does South Africa which also provides leadership to AU activism which has proven so important, and Russia has played an important and constructive role in South Sudan<sup>19</sup>, Mali, and elsewhere. I believe that more energy needs to be dedicated to engaging with the BRICS and to securing their support and leadership on taking the practical steps needed to prevent atrocities. As I said earlier, we need an evidence-based approach based on what works to actually prevent and stop atrocity crimes.

**— How do you see the role and key achievements of the Asia Pacific Centre for the R2P?**

— Ours is a very small Centre, whose role is to support and assist governments, regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations in implementing R2P.

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<sup>18</sup> Examples of draft resolutions, which was vetoed by Russia and China: Security Council Resolution S/2011/612; Security Council Resolution S/2012/538; Security Council Resolution S/2014/348.

<sup>19</sup> Security Council Resolution, established the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), S/RES/1996 (8<sup>th</sup> of July, 2011). URL: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/Sudan%20SRES%201996.pdf> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

We are now in our tenth year. Initially, we focused on simply raising awareness and building consensus and understanding about R2P. This is done through national dialogues<sup>20</sup>, seminars<sup>21</sup>, and by translating core documents into local languages<sup>22</sup>. For example, we have translated the R2P agreement itself and the UN's Atrocity Prevention Framework into Khmer<sup>23</sup>, Indonesian<sup>24</sup>, Burmese, and Thai<sup>25</sup>, and are currently preparing some documents in Chinese<sup>26</sup>. Where possible, we also conduct national meetings in local languages. In the last few years, we have moved to support implementation through national and regional programs<sup>27</sup>. Each one is different, tailored to what actors themselves want to do. For example, in partnership with the China Institute for International Studies, the think tank of the foreign minister, we organize an annual dialogue of experts and diplomats<sup>28</sup> to share views and perspectives. We also exchange staff, with some of my colleagues spending a few months in Beijing and Chinese colleagues spending time with us. This is helped to build trust and understanding and fostered some common work. For example, we have focused on the role of peacekeepers in protecting populations and recently completed a joint project looking at the Kigali principles. We are also doing joint work on early warning indicators<sup>29</sup>. Elsewhere, in Cambodia we support the work of the National R2P Focal Point<sup>30</sup> and his efforts to build national

<sup>20</sup> For instance, 4th China Dialogue. URL: <https://www.vision6.com.au/em/message/email/view.php?id=977816&u=86116&k=YtgGY1IeTjqddM32FQZV-SN1jp3OYDuzIpbNsg0FX0s> (accessed: 21.11.2018); National Dialogue Indonesia. URL: <https://www.vision6.com.au/em/message/email/view.php?id=943484&a=59505&k=LUymA8AUZF0sfuMYxi8hT1Ac5-Xn4WgrGqCEpIBDCCA> (accessed: 21.11.2018); First R2P National Dialogue in Thailand. URL: [https://www.vision6.com.au/em/message/email/view.php?id=903911&u=86116&k=Huwvz9eU14H3k1ftJAeDspmaOl\\_05SHoxilu60-TTPg](https://www.vision6.com.au/em/message/email/view.php?id=903911&u=86116&k=Huwvz9eU14H3k1ftJAeDspmaOl_05SHoxilu60-TTPg) (accessed: 21.11.2018); National Dialogue: Cambodia. URL: <https://www.vision6.com.au/em/message/email/view.php?id=882383&u=86116&k=GjuQTmNg1BHMgGco7Ofrc4db0pNVVDXT9b5z1O9nKF8> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>21</sup> Events. URL: <https://r2pasiapacific.org/events> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>22</sup> Translated R2P documents. URL: <https://r2pasiapacific.org/resources-and-training/resources> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>23</sup> Thai and Khmer informal translations of Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. URL: <https://www.vision6.com.au/em/message/email/view.php?id=977816&u=86116&k=YtgGY1IeTjqddM32FQZV-SN1jp3OYDuzIpbNsg0FX0s> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>24</sup> Toolkit on the Responsibility to Protect (translation into Indonesian). URL: [https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/325/ICRtoP\\_toolkit\\_bahasa\\_indonesia.pdf](https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/325/ICRtoP_toolkit_bahasa_indonesia.pdf) (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>25</sup> Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (translation into Thai). URL: [https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/352/2017\\_thai\\_informal\\_translation\\_Framework\\_of\\_Analysis.pdf](https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/352/2017_thai_informal_translation_Framework_of_Analysis.pdf) (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>26</sup> Toolkit on the Responsibility to Protect (translation into Mandarin). URL: <https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/346/ICRtoP-toolkit-chinese-translation.pdf> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>27</sup> R2P in the Asia Pacific. URL: <https://r2pasiapacific.org/r2p-asia-pacific> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>28</sup> 4th China Dialogue. URL: <https://www.vision6.com.au/em/message/email/view.php?id=977816&u=86116&k=YtgGY1IeTjqddM32FQZV-SN1jp3OYDuzIpbNsg0FX0s> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>29</sup> Early Warning and Atrocity Prevention. URL: <https://r2pasiapacific.org/early-warning-and-atrocity-prevention> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>30</sup> Cambodia: National Dialogue on R2P and Atrocities Prevention. URL: [https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/596/spotlight\\_oct2016\\_issue34\\_cambodia\\_national\\_dialogue.pdf](https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/596/spotlight_oct2016_issue34_cambodia_national_dialogue.pdf) (accessed: 21.11.2018).

capacity for atrocity prevention, by helping with training, providing technical support, and assisting his international efforts. We also work with regional bodies, for example the ASEAN Commission on the Protection of Women and Children<sup>31</sup>. We ran a series of seminars with the Commission on the prevention of mass sexual and gender-based violence and are now working with the Commission to strengthen its capacity in that regard. Our role in the Centre is very much supportive — the initiation and direction of the work is driven by our partners<sup>32</sup>.

**— In our turbulent world with a high degree of conflictual potential using the R2P norm maintains as one of the instruments in protecting civilians. The Syrian conflict proves it quite evidently. Could we generally speak about the success of the R2P norm being reached for the last 10 years? Or does it still contain some hidden risks and challenges?**

— The challenge for states now is to make R2P a living reality. We now have a broad consensus on the principal itself and some examples of it working well in practice. One especially important aspect of this is the growing significance of the African Union, which is playing a pivotal and often highly effective role. ECOWAS too makes important contributions. Syria was always going to be a difficult case because of its regional and geopolitical importance. But it does underscore how far we have to go to ensure that atrocity prevention is prioritized when it needs to be. Of course, practice is never neat and tidy. It is messy and unpredictable. And atrocity prevention is a new field. So even with the best of intentions, we won't always succeed and nor be able to predict the risks and challenges ahead. So we have to remain alert and we have to do a better job of analyzing and learning the lessons from what we do. In doing so, we have to be open and honest, and we all need to recognize and correct our mistakes. The key, I think, lies in expanding informal, off the record, dialogue about atrocity prevention. We need to get officials and analysts together, from different parts of the world, more often to engage in frank discussion. But before that can hand we need to rebuild bonds of trust so often damaged by geopolitics. There are certainly challenges and risks to R2P, but one thing we do know is that the risks of inaction are far greater. I'd very much like to see Russian analysts and diplomats engaging more in informal or track 2 diplomacy and hope that we can work together to make that a reality.

*Interviewed by S.A. Bokeriya*

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<sup>31</sup> SEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). URL: <https://asean.org/asean-socio-cultural/asean-ministerial-meeting-on-social-welfare-and-development-ammswd/acwc-php/> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

<sup>32</sup> The Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocity Prevention (APPAP), High Level Advisory Panel on the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia. URL: <https://r2pasiapacific.org/supporting-regional-partnerships> (accessed: 21.11.2018).

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## **Ответственность по защите (R2P): концепция, желательная норма или принцип?**

**Интервью с профессором Алексом Дж. Беллами,  
Университет Квинсленда (Австралия)**

Профессор Алекс Дж. Беллами является директором Азиатско-Тихоокеанского центра ответственности по защите, профессором по изучению проблем мира и конфликтов Университета Квинсленда (Австралия), старшим советником-нерезидентом Международного института мира (Нью-Йорк). Он является автором книги «Косово и международное сообщество» [Bellamy 2002], «Сообщества безопасности и их соседи: региональные крепости или глобальные интеграторы?» [Bellamy 2004], «Понимание миротворчества» [Bellamy, Williams, Griffin 2004], «Международное

сообщество и его критика» [Bellamy 2005], «Только войны: от Цицерона до Ирака» [Bellamy 2006], «Борьба с терроризмом: этические дилеммы» [Bellamy 2008], «Ответственность по защите: глобальные усилия по прекращению массовых зверств» [Bellamy 2009], «Ответственность по защите: оборона» [Bellamy 2014], «Обеспечение миротворцев: политика, проблемы и будущее проведения операций ООН по поддержанию мира» [Bellamy, Williams 2013] и «Резня и мораль» [Bellamy 2012].

Алекс Дж. Беллами — один из редакторов журнала «Этика и международные отношения», соредатор журнала «Глобальная ответственность по защите».

В своем интервью профессор Беллами рассказывает об институционализации концепции R2P, которая сможет помочь в предотвращении геноцида, военных преступлений, этнических чисток и преступлений против человечности. Профессор Беллами выделяет три категории ситуаций, в которых очень трудно защитить мирных жителей.

**Ключевые слова:** ответственность за защиту (R2P), ООН, миротворчество, Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион, Ближний Восток, сирийский конфликт, геноцид народа рохинджа в Мьянме

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